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Introduction 
Today, it is taken for granted that trade mark infringement—
whether of registered or unregistered marks (so-called “passing off”)—
is a matter of strict liability.1 A person infringes, irrespective of whether 
 
†  Herchel Smith Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of 
Cambridge. Thanks to Christina Angelopoulos, Chris Beauchamp, Jose 
Bellido, Bob Brauneis, Jennifer Davis, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Richard 
Epstein, Alex Ferguson, Dev Gangjee, Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, John 
Liddicoat, Paul Mitchell, Adam Mossoff and Kara Swanson for 
commenting on earlier drafts of this Article. 
1. L. Bently, B. Sherman, D. Gangjee & P. Johnson, Intellectual 
Property Law 888–89 (5th ed. 2018) (passing off); id. at 1103 (registered 
marks); James Mellor, David Llewelyn, Thomas Moody-Stuart, 
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they knew of the plaintiff’s business or trade mark, irrespective of 
whether they copied an existing mark or developed their own, and 
irrespective of whether they believed the mark used by another trader 
was descriptive or generic. At the same time, it is widely assumed that 
modern trade mark law derived from the law of deceit for which 
scienter—specifically an intent to deceive—was a requirement.2 The 
aim of this article is to try and gain an understanding of how this 
perceived shift from intent-based liability to strict liability came about,3 
 
David Keeling, Iona Berkeley, Ashton Chantrielle & William 
Duncan, Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names § 20-029 
(16th ed. 2017) (footnote omitted) (describing passing off cases and stating 
“fraud is not a necessary element of the right of action, and the absence of 
an intention to deceive is not a defence”); Christopher Wadlow, The 
Law of Passing Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation 
§5-51 (5th ed. 2016) (“The defendant’s state of mind is wholly irrelevant 
to the existence of the cause of action for passing-off”); Harold G. Fox, 
The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition 403 
(3d ed. 1972) (“As in the question of infringement of patents, a defendant’s 
intention has no relevance”). For authorities, see Marengo v. Daily Sketch 
& Sunday Graphic Ld, 65 RPC 242 (HL 1948) 242–43 (granting injunction 
against cartoonist using name “Kim,” because of likelihood of confusion 
with another cartoonist named “Kem,” though adoption of sign was 
innocent); AG Spalding & Bros. v. AW Gamage Ltd., 32 RPC 273 (HL 
1915) 283–88 (Lord Parker), 289–90 (Lord Parmoor); Reed Exec. PLC. v. 
Reed Bus. Info. Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 159, [2004] RPC 40, [109] (Jacob 
LJ) (“It is long and well settled that it is no defence to passing off that the 
defendant has or had no intention to deceive”). For the United States, see 
Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 2099, 2108 (2004) (referring to trademark infringement as moving 
from intent-based to strict liability action); Alfred C. Yen, Intent and 
Trademark Infringement, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 713, 714 (2015) (“It matters 
not whether the defendant created confusion intentionally or accidentally”). 
2. See, e.g., Marengo v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic Ld., 65 RPC 242 
(HL 1948), 253–54 (Lord du Parcq). However, even in the 1830s and 40s, 
different courts and judges operated different conceptions of precisely 
what was required to establish deceit. Compare Michael Lobban, 
Intentional and Economic Torts, in 12 The Oxford History of the 
Laws of England 1040–41 (2010) (tort of deceit), with Michael Lobban, 
Misrepresentation, in 12 The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England 411–32 (2010) (misrepresentation in contract); see also Michael 
Lobban, Contractual Fraud in Law and Equity, c1750–c1850, 17 Oxford 
J. Legal Stud. 441, 472–3 (1997). 
3. The definition of strict liability has generated a considerable literature. 
See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Six Senses of Strict Liability: A Plea for 
Formalism, in Appraising Strict Liability 1–20 (A.P. Simester ed., 
2005); Larry Alexander, Is There a Case for Strict Liability?, 12 Crim. 
L. & Phil. 531, 531–32 (2018) (distinguishing between culpable wrongs 
and non-culpable ones, including negligence based liability); Jules L. 
Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part I, 1 L. 
& Phil. 371, 376–78 (1982) (distinguishing senses of strict liability); John 
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and, more generally, the changing significance of scienter, in particular 
intention to deceive, in nineteenth-century trade mark law in England 
and Wales. 
Hitherto, the story has been told largely in terms of a simple, 
evolutionary logic. Trade mark protection, it is said, was first 
recognised at common law, and the common law courts required a 
plaintiff to prove an intent to deceive. Later, probably as late as the 
early nineteenth century, the courts of equity gave assistance by way 
of an injunction. As the chief forum for litigating trade mark infringe–
ment shifted from law to equity, the latter abandoned the requirement 
of an intent to deceive, following a key decision of the Lord Chancellor 
in Millington v. Fox in 1838.4 Thereafter, proceedings for trade mark 
infringement were in essence equitable.5 It is true that by the end of the 
 
C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and 
the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 743 (2016) (arguing 
that many scholars mischaracterize strict liability in distinguishing it from 
fault-based liability). On a different standard which might be applied in 
patent cases, and the concept of strict liability, see Roger D. Blair & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 799, 807–08 (2002). For a careful analysis of the 
concepts of strict liability and fault-based liability in copyright see Patrick 
R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 305, 312–19 (2015). 
4. Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338 (Ch. 1838). For classic accounts that 
assume Millington was a turning point, see D.M. Kerly, The Law of 
Trade-marks, Trade-name, and Merchandise Marks 2–5 (1st ed. 
1894); Lewis Boyd Sebastian, The Law of Trade Marks and Their 
Registration and Matters Connected Therewith 7–8, 12 (Lewis 
Boyd Sebastian, Harry Baird Hemming & S. Raymond Sebastian eds., 5th 
ed. 1911) (arguing that the need “to prove knowledge . . . and intentional 
deception” has not been required “to obtain an injunction in Chancery . . . 
since Millington v. Fox [], in 1833 [sic]”); Grover C. Grismore, Fraudulent 
Intent in Trade Mark Cases, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 860 (1929) 
(explaining that the Millington decision “worked a fundamental change in 
the theory of trade mark protection”); Fox, supra note 1, at 1 (3d ed. 
1972); Wadlow, supra note 1, § 5-50, at 287 (footnote omitted) (“From 
1838 equity . . . would . . . grant an injunction . . . irrespective of the 
defendant’s initial state of mind.”); Kenneth R. Swan, Patents, 
Designs, and Trade Marks 279–80 (1908) (“The case of Millington v. 
Fox, decided in 1834 [sic], definitely established the principle that a trader 
has a good right of action against any person who wrongfully assumes his 
trade mark, even in the absence of proof of fraudulent intent.”). 
5. J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming & P.G. Turner, Meagher, Gummow 
and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies § 43-005 (5th ed. 2015) 
(“What is generally regarded as the modern tort of passing off is in truth 
the product of equity as much as if not more than of law.”). 
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century,6 scienter was not required in most cases (and certainly not for 
registered marks, after the introduction of registration in 1876),7 but a 
closer look suggests that the conventional account is much too 
simplistic and the development of the law in the period from 1830 to 
1875 was much messier, contested, and ad hoc. 
My goal in revisiting this history is not to suggest that adoption of 
strict liability was a false turn.8 Rather, the goal is to understand how 
the modern law came to be as it is. Indeed, this may have implications 
for a number of current legal questions, the answers to which are very 
muddled. Is there a distinction between primary and accessory liability 
in the law of trade marks, the latter requiring a showing of scienter?9 
Is there a defence of using one’s own name, and, if so, what is its scope?10 
 
6. Kerly called it “well-settled law.” Kerly, supra note 4, at 316; D.M. 
Kerly, The Law of Trade-marks, Trade-name, and Merchandise 
Marks 375 (D.M. Kerly & F.G. Underhay eds., 2nd ed. 1901); D.M. 
Kerly, The Law of Trade-marks and Trade-name 402 (D.M. Kerly 
& F.G. Underhay eds., 3rd ed. 1908). Even today, the treatise uses the same 
language. Mellor et al., supra note 1, § 20-029.  
7. See Trade Mark Registration Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91, § 5 (U.K.). 
For background, see generally Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern 
Trade Mark Law: The Construction of the Legal Concept of Trade Mark 
(1860–1880), in Trade Marks and Brands: An Interdisciplinary 
Critique 1–41 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 
2008). 
8. Cf. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in 
Copyright, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 351 (2002) (criticizing strict liability in 
copyright); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and 
Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 767, 775–
84 (2011) (arguing the same); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict 
Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 799 
(2002) (approving strict liability for patents for the most part, though with 
a scienter-based standard for liability in damages); Patrick R. Goold, Patent 
Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law, 95 Ind. L.J. 1075, 
1079 (2020) (arguing that “a negligence rule is preferable because it creates 
incentives for both technology users and patentees to adopt reasonable, cost-
justified care to avoid accidents”). 
9. See Lionel Bently, The Doctrine of Instruments of Fraud in Historical 
Perspective, in The Cambridge Handbook of International and 
Comparative Trademark Law 468, 468–81 (Irene Calboli & Jane C. 
Ginsburg eds., 2020). 
10. See Gilbert Kodilinye, Passing Off and the Use of Personal Names, 26 N. 
Ir. Legal Q. 177 (1975) (arguing for such a defence); Christopher 
Wadlow, Is There an Own-Name Defence in the Common Law Tort of 
Passing-off? The Implications of Asprey, Reed and Newman v. Adlem, in 
Trade Mark Law and Sharing Names 129 (Ilanah Simon Fhima ed., 
2009); Christopher Wadlow, The Own-Name Defence in Passing-off: Six 
Pennyworth of Thoughts from the Other Side, 1 Queen Mary J. Intell. 
Prop. 130 (2011) (seeking to explain divergent approaches to answering 
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Is a successful claimant in a trade mark action entitled either to 
damages or an account of profits?11 Contemporary lawyers who pick 
authorities from the past, without engaging with the broader shifts in 
trade mark thinking, are likely to misunderstand these authorities or 
be misled by them. This article aims to unpick the history and thereby 
to offer some guidance. 
The article begins with a brief account of Millington v. Fox itself. I 
suggest that while it has been positioned as a landmark in a seamless 
transition from intent-based liability to strict liability (and from law to 
equity), the court likely thought it was carrying out a mere clarification 
of the standard applicable both at common law and in equity. However, 
in the years following Millington, the courts of common law did, indeed, 
make clear that scienter was required to establish trade mark infringe–
ment, and chancery courts also moved in that direction. In many 
respects, in the 1840s, Millington became not a landmark so much as a 
loose-end. Section II describes how, at the end of the 1850s, a number 
of judges embraced Millington and strict liability (in the sense that 
innocence or ignorance at the time of adopting the mark is no bar to 
injunctive relief). Section III offers some reasons as to why this 
occurred. 
I. Millington v. Fox 
A. Millington 
Millington v. Fox concerned the use of words “CROWLEY” and 
“MILLINGTON,” as well as some associated marks, on steel.12 The 
plaintiffs, Thomas Isaac Millington and Crowley Millington, were 
successors to the partnership “Crowley Millington & Co,” making steel 
near Newcastle in the North East of England,13 much of which was 
 
the question). Such a defence exists in relation to use of registered trade 
marks. Trade Marks Act 1994, c. 26 § 11(2)(a). 
11. See Marengo v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic Ld., 65 RPC 242 (HL 
1948), 247 (expressing no view as to the question raised in argument 
regarding whether a defendant can be held liable in damages for an innocent 
“passing off” due to ignorance of material facts, on the basis that equity has 
established a rule that every “passing off” is an invasion of property); 
Gillette UK v. Edenwest, 111 RPC 279, 293 (Ch. 1994) (Blackburne J) 
(“[D]ishonesty on the defendant’s part is not necessary before a plaintiff can 
recover damages . . . for passing off.”). 
12. Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 338–40 (Ch. 1838). 
13. Id. at 338–39, 351. For an extended history, see M.W. Flinn, Men of 
Iron: The Crowleys in the Early Iron Industry (1962). The firm 
was founded by Ambrose Crowley III (1658–1713), and its products 
included axes, chisels, files, forks, tongs and anchors, for which it developed 
a stellar reputation. Id. at 55. According to Flinn, Swalwell was probably 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
The Place of Scienter in Trade Mark Infringement                                  
in Nineteenth Century England 
498 
exported to America. The defendants, James and Samuel Fox, were 
partners in a relatively newly established firm called “Fox Bros” in 
Sheffield.14 The plaintiff had been alerted to the defendant’s sale of steel 
stamped with the marks and, on 7 August 1834, issued a bill in the 
Court of Chancery seeking discovery, injunctive relief, and an account.15 
The bill alleged that “for fraudulent purposes on steel manufactured by 
them the said Defendants used and imitated the said marks . . . in order 
to enable the said steel to be passed off in the market as steel 
manufactured by your Orators.”16 A preliminary injunction was granted 
ex parte, and the defendants entered their answer,17 explaining that 
 
the largest “industrial unit in the country at this time apart from the naval 
dockyards.” Id. at 54.  
 From 1782, one of the salaried managers, Isaiah Millington (the grandfather 
of the claimants) entered the partnership, and a succession of Millingtons 
managed the business from then until 1863. Id. at 88–91. Isaiah died in 
1806, and eventually his grandson Crowley Millington ran the business until 
he died in 1849. Flinn, supra, at 91. 
 While it had been a huge success in the eighteenth century, the business 
gradually went into decline. Flinn has suggested this resulted from a 
combination of factors: the replacement of hand-forged nails with machine-
made nails; the reduced importance of Swedish and Russian bar iron to 
steel-making; the absence of Admiralty business after the end of the 
Napoleonic war; the introduction of rail transport (and reduced advantage 
of being on the North Sea); and a failure to innovate. Id. at 94–95. 
 Quite how quick the decline was is difficult to say. A more recent study 
by David Cranstone has contested Flinn’s account and suggests that “Mr. 
Crowley Millington’s tenure can be seen as an attempted rally, unsuccess–
ful for the manual workshop side of the business but much more successful 
for steel-making.” David Cranstone, From Slitting Mill to Alloy Steel: The 
Development of Swalwell Ironworks, 33 Indus. Archaeology Rev. 40, 
55 (2011). 
14. The defendants had in 1831 set up in Sheffield as steel manufacturers and 
merchants under the name Fox Brothers. Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 
at 342. For the first year, the partners operated a steel-converting furnace 
making steel which they marked “Fox Brothers.” Id. Thereafter they 
operated merely as merchants and dealers in steel and files, though in that 
capacity it seems they would commission third parties to make steel. Id. 
Their goods were sold almost entirely in North America, where it was said 
by the plaintiff to be undercutting the plaintiff’s sales. Id. The bill and 
answer do not even disclose the address of the Fox Brothers’ works.  
15. Millington v. Fox, C13/1872/1 (bill filed 7 August 1834). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. In fact, initially Samuel Fox entered an answer dated 13 December 
1834, prompting Millington to amend its bill, which it did on 8 April 1835. 
Once James Fox had returned from America, Samuel and James entered 
a joint answer dated 7 July 1835 and a further one, in response to a ruling 
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they had understood the terms CROWLEY and MILLINGTON to 
indicate particular types of steel,18 and that they had never heard of the 
plaintiffs. While the defendants had agreed to cease using the words 
(even before the plaintiffs entered their bill), the plaintiffs pursued the 
matter and there followed a commission to examine witnesses,19 a 
process that took up most of 1836, and ultimately a hearing, seeking a 
perpetual injunction and account.20 
At the hearing before Lord Cottenham LC, counsel for the 
defendants argued that it had not been proved that the defendants had 
made use of the Plaintiffs’ marks “knowingly and wilfully.”21 Although 
the claim to an account was abandoned,22 Lord Cottenham LC awarded 
the injunction. He explained: 
I see no reason to believe that there has, in this case, been a 
fraudulent use of the Plaintiffs’ marks. It is positively denied by 
the answer; and there is no evidence to shew that the Defendants 
were even aware of the existence of the Plaintiffs, as a company 
manufacturing steel; for although there is no evidence to shew 
that the terms “Crowley,” and “Crowley Millington,” were merely 
 
to produce correspondence between the two brothers, on 19 November 
1835. Samuel Fox’s Answer, Fox, C13/1862/1 (Dec. 13, 1834). 
18. This is explained in a letter from Luke Palfreyman, solicitor, to Crowley 
Millington, dated 2 August 1834. Millington, 3 My. & Cr. at 343–44. More 
specifically, Samuel Fox’s answer stated, “by the term ‘Crowley’ steel, the 
Defendant always understood tilted, rolled, or single shear, or sheared 
steel, made up in a bundle of one hundred weight, and manufactured from 
a bar of steel; and by the term ‘Crowley Millington’ steel, shear or sheared 
steel, made up in bundles of one hundred weight and manufactured from 
several bars.” Samuel Fox’s Answer, Fox, C13/1862/1, f. 4 (Dec. 13, 
1834). 
19. TNA: C33/874, f. 541v (May 3, 1836) (determining the period during 
which the commission could take evidence). 
20. Millington, 3 My. & Cr. at 350–51. 
21. Id. at 350–51. Counsel arguing on Defendant’s behalf included the Solicitor 
General, Robert Rolfe (later, Lord Cranworth LC). See G.F. Russell Barker, 
Rolfe, Robert Monsey, in 49 Dictionary of National Biography 158–
61 (Sidney Lee, ed. 1897). Chancery Bills, like common law declarations, 
typically alleged fraud. See, e.g., Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213 (Ch. 1836) 
(stating in the bill that the Defendant did certain acts “with the view and 
design of fraudulently procuring the custom of persons who were in the 
habit of using the omnibuses of the Plaintiffs”).  
22. In fact, Wigram, Plaintiff’s counsel, abandoned the claim in response to 
Lord Cottenham LC’s prompting, and Lord Cottenham later observed 
that he had been very sensible to do so. Id. at 350–51. Fox had admitted 
selling 43 cwt of steel to purchasers in Montreal, Lower Canada, for a 
value of £128 and a profit of £6 10 shillings. 
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technical terms, yet there is sufficient to shew that they were very 
generally used, in conversation at least, as descriptive of partic–
ular qualities of steel. In short, it does not appear to me that there 
was any fraudulent intention in the use of the marks. That 
circumstance, however, does not deprive the Plaintiffs of their 
right to the exclusive use of those names; and therefore I stated, 
that the case is so made out as to entitle the Plaintiffs to have 
the injunction made perpetual.23 
Lord Cottenham LC thus awarded injunctive relief on the same terms 
as the interim order, that is to say: 
to restrain the Dfts & each of them their & each of their Servants 
& Agents from stamping and impressg or causg to be stamped or 
impressed on any Bars of Steel or or pieces of Steel the names 
Crowley Millington or either of them or any other the Names or 
Marks or any Material part of any of the Marks in the Pets Bill 
mentd to be stamped by the Pets on Steel manufactd by the Pets 
& from manufacturg or causing to be manufactd & also from sellg 
or contractg to sell and Bars of Steel or or pieces of steel stamped 
with any of the sd Names of Marks or any materl part of any of 
the sd Marks or any Name or mark in Imitation of any of the sd 
names or any material part of any of sd Marks.24 
However, the Lord Chancellor declined to order costs in favour of either 
party. 
B. Not a Revolution 
As noted in the introduction, the decision has long been regarded 
as a key moment in the evolution of trade mark law. This is because, 
for the first time, the Court of Chancery treated trade mark violations 
as ones of strict liability, in the sense that injunctive relief would be 
awarded irrespective of the scienter of the user at the time the mark 
was adopted.25 This case, it is said, introduced a divergence between 
law and equity. This part suggests that such an account is historically 
inaccurate, or at least a considerable over-simplification. It argues that, 
in fact, the position ‘at law’ was unclear and, almost certainly, Lord 
Cottenham thought that while he might have been clarifying the law, 
he was not creating a divergence between law and equity.26 Rather, he 
 
23. Id. at 352. 
24. TNA: C33/886, f. 454r. 
25. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  
26. Cf. Henry Ludlow & Henry Jenkyns, A Treatise on the Law of 
Trade-Marks and Trade-Names 7–12 (London, 1873) (explaining 
that trade-mark was somewhat hard to distinguish from misrepresentation 
which provided equitable remedies). 
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understood his holding in Millington as an incremental development. 
The radical nature of the decision only became apparent later when 
common law courts made clear that scienter was a prerequisite to trade 
mark infringement. 
1. The State of the Case-law 
When Millington v. Fox was decided, in 1838, there was relatively 
little reported case-law concerning trade marks. At this point, there 
were no treatises that focussed on trade mark law and the topic was 
hardly touched in digests, journals, and other published works. 
Most famously (to trade mark historians at least) there were the 
three reports of a non-trade mark case, Southern v. How, which 
recounted, each in a different way, how Dodderidge J recalled a case 
(now commonly known as “the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case”) from 
the time of Elizabeth I in which an action had been brought at common 
law relating to the unauthorised use of one clothier’s mark by another 
clothier.27 In addition, there were at least three reports of other cases 
at common law: Singleton v. Bolton, where the plaintiff had been non-
suited, decided in 1783 but only reported in 1831;28 and two, in 1824 
and 1833, in which a plaintiff had succeeded—Sykes v. Sykes29 and 
Blofeld v. Payne.30 Although the action at law was by 1838 well-
established, there were so few reports because there was no tradition of 
reporting cases at nisi prius, where most common law cases were 
concluded.31  
In addition there were nine reported cases in Chancery: the oldest 
was Blanchard v. Hill, where Lord Hardwicke LC had refused injunctive 
 
27. Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468 (K.B. 1618), 471; Poph. 143 (K.B. 1618); 2 
Rolle Rep. 28 (K.B. 1619). For discussion on the three reports of Southern 
v. How, see Frank I. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the 
Law Relating to Trade-Marks 6–10, 123–24 (1925). For a discussion 
of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s case, JG v. Samford, see Sir John Baker, 
Sources of English Legal History Private Law to 1750, at 673–76 
(2d ed. 2010). 
28. Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293 (K.B. 1783). For further discussion of 
the reporting of this case, see Lionel Bently, The First Trademark Case 
at Common Law? The Story of Singleton v. Bolton (1783), 47 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 969, 986–88 (2014). 
29. Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, 541–43 (K.B. 1824).  
30. Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. 410, 410–12 (K.B. 1833). 
31. The first nisi prius reports were from Thomas Peake (1790–95) and Isaac 
Espinasse (1793–1810). See Sir John Baker, An Introduction to 
English Legal History 439 n.72 (5th ed. 2019). 
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relief in relation to an image mark for playing cards.32 In a second, 
Canham v. Jones, the defendant’s demurrer succeeded;33 while in Motley 
v. Downman, the Lord Chancellor dissolved an injunction that had been 
initially awarded, sending the parties to try the action at law.34 In the 
other six reported cases the plaintiffs had been granted preliminary 
injunctions. These were Hogg v. Irby;35 Day v. Billing;36 Henry v. Price;37 
Gout v. Aleplogphu;38 Ransome v. Bentall;39 and Knott v. Morgan.40 By 
1838, there was no report of a case in which a trade mark owner had 
been awarded a perpetual injunction; though it is not surprising that 
interim injunctive was sufficient to conclude proceedings in most cases.  
Some of these reports hinted at a requirement that to succeed a 
plaintiff must demonstrate fraud. For example, Popham’s account of 
Dodderidge J’s memory of the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case (accord–
ing to which the trader, rather than the deceived purchaser succeeded), 
the judge described the defendant as having used the mark on cloth “on 
purpose to deceive him.”41 However, the report does not make clear 
whether the judge was recalling the facts in front of the court, or 
specifying pre-requisites that the Elizabethan Court of Common Pleas 
had been establishing. In Singleton v. Bolton, in 1783, Lord Mansfield 
refused relief to the purveyor of “DR JOHNSON’S YELLOW 
 
32. 2 Atk. 484, 484–87 (Ch. 1742) (Hardwicke LC) (the “Great Mogul” 
playing card). 
33. 2 Ves. & B. 218 (Ch. 1813) (Sir Thomas Plumer VC) (injunction refused in 
case where defendant had sold “Velno’s Vegetable Syrup,” the court 
inferring that this was an indication as to the quality of the defendant’s 
goods, their origin with the defendant rather than the plaintiff being clear). 
34. 3 My. & Cr. 1, 14–17 (Ch. 1837) (Cottenham LC) (where the plaintiff had 
marked its tin plates “M.C.” before relocating its manufactory, the new 
occupier of the plaintiff's old premises claimed to be entitled to stamp 
“M.C.” on its tin plates). 
35. 8 Ves. Jun. 215, 215–28 (Ch. 1803) (Eldon LC) (granting an injunction 
against presenting magazine as continuation of an existing title). 
36. 1 C.C. Cooper’s Rep. 489 , Day v Binning (sic) 1 Leg. Obs. 205 (Ch. 1831) 
(Shadwell VC) (injunction awarded to makers of “Day and Martin” boot 
polish against defendant, Edward Billing of Bermondsey, who labelled his 
boot polish “equal to Day and Martin”, with “equal to” in smaller letter–
ing “so as not to be clearly perceptible”). 
37. 1 Leg. Obs. 364 (Ch. 1831) (Shadwell VC) (“Henry’s Calcined Magnesia”). 
38. 5 Leg. Obs. 495 (Ch. 1833), 1 Chit. Gen. Prac. 721, 6 Beav. 69, at fn. 
(watches). 
39. 3 LJR 161 (Ch. 1834) (Shadwell VC) (“HH6” for ploughs). 
40. 2 Keen 213, 219 (Ch. 1836) (Langdale MR) (name and appearance of 
buses). 
41. Southern v. How, Poph 143, 143–44 (K.B. 1618). 
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OINTMENT,” but acknowledged that “if the defendant had sold a 
medicine of his own under the plaintiff’s name or mark, that would be 
a fraud for which an action would lie.”42 Again, it is not clear whether 
the reference to fraud is a conclusion or implies that intent is a 
prerequisite to the action. In Sykes v. Sykes, in 1824, where the plaintiff 
succeeded at common law in preventing the sale of shotbelts and flasks 
marked “SYKES PATENT,” the defendant was reported to have 
marked its shotbelts “in order to denote they were the genuine 
manufacture of the plaintiff.”43 At least one digest mentioned scienter, 
but in terms of intent to injure rather than intent to deceive, thus 
making the picture even more confused.44 
Significantly, one report of the most recently decided common law 
case, Blofeld v. Payne, suggested that common law protection related 
to an exclusive right, thus marginalising the importance of intention.45 
There the defendant had wrapped his goods in the plaintiff’s packaging, 
and the jury, though finding the defendant’s goods not to be inferior, 
held the defendant liable (albeit awarding only a farthing in damages). 
When the defendant moved to enter a non-suit, the Court of King’s 
Bench affirmed the verdict. According to one report, a number of judges 
implied that there was damage because Blofeld had some sort of 
“right.”46 Littledale J was reported to have stated that “[t]he act of the 
defendants was a fraud against the plaintiff; and if it occasioned him 
no specific damage, it was still, to a certain extent, an injury to his 
right.”47 The same reporter quoted Patteson J as having stated that 
 
42. Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293, 293 (K.B. 1783). 
43. Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, 541–43 (K.B. 1824). For an alternate report 
by James Dowling and Archer Ryland, see Sykes v. Sykes, 5 Dowl. & Ry. 
292 (K.B. 1824). 
44. Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (8th ed. London, 1762) (citing 
2 Cro. 471) (“And if one Man shall use the Mark of another, to the Intent 
to do him Damage, Action upon the Case lieth.”). See also Thomas 
Potts, A Compendious Law Dictionary 444 (London, 1803) (citing 2 
Cro. 471) (“Mark of goods, is used to ascertain their property or quality, 
[etc.] and if one man shall use the mark of another, with intent to do him 
damage, upon injury proved, an action on the case will lie.”) (emphasis 
added). Some commentaries do not mention scienter. See, e.g., 1 John 
Mallory, Modern Entries in English 418 (Dublin, 1791) (citing 2 
Rolle Rep. 28) (an action “lies against a tradesman for putting another’s 
mark to his own commodities.”). 
45. Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. 410 (K.B. 1833). 
46. Id. at 411–12. 
47. Id. at 411 (Littledale J). But see Blofeld v. Payne, 1 N. & M. 353, 354 
(K.B. 1833) (reporting Mr. Justice Littledale as stating “by the fraudulent 
act of the defendant the plaintiff may possibly have been prevented from 
selling so many of his hones as he otherwise might have sold”). 
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“[t]he defendants used the plaintiff’s envelope, and pretended it was 
their own: they had no right to do that, and the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover some damages in consequence.”48 Although these statements 
are replete with ambiguity as to the requirements treating trade mark 
infringement as violation of a right could have been read as making 
scienter irrelevant. 
One interpretation of Blofeld v Payne was that the common law 
courts were rejecting a requirement of intention. If so, this might have 
seemed to contemporaries to be consistent with ongoing developments 
in the law of defamation in this period. As explained by legal historian 
Paul Mitchell,49 while at the start of the Nineteenth century it was 
necessary for a plaintiff in defamation proceedings to establish 
“malice,”50 in 1824 this was diluted into a requirement of “malice in 
law,” that is, “a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or 
excuse;”51 and within a decade the courts had further explained that 
the defendant’s intention could be established by means of the 
presumption that “every man must be presumed to intend the natural 
and ordinary consequences of his own act.”52 The effect of this shift was 
 
48. Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & Ad. at 412 (Patteson J). 
49. For a historical analysis of defamation law, see Paul Mitchell, The 
Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (2005) [hereinafter 
Mitchell, Modern Law of Defamation]. For more on the analytical 
flaws underlying modern, strict-liability defamation law, see Paul Mitchell, 
Malice in Defamation, 114 L.Q. Rev. 639 (1998).  
50. Mitchell, Modern Law of Defamation, supra note 49, at 101–08. 
Mitchell says that the orthodox position before 1824 was that presented 
by Judge Park at nisi prius in Bromage v. Prosser: 
To support an action for words, malice is essential; but malice 
may be presumed by the jury, either from their being false, from 
the nature of the words themselves, from the manner of the 
speaking of them, or from other evidence; but then the absence of 
malice may be shown on the other side: and if it were not 
competent to the jury to consider the question of malice or no 
malice, and for the defendant to show that he was not actuated 
by any malice, the communications of society must be at an end. 
 Id. at 102 (quoting Bromage v. Prosser, 1 Car. & P. 475, 476 (K.B. 1824)).  
51. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B & C 247, 255 (K.B. 1825) (Bayley J). Sir John 
Bayley, who sat in Kings Bench from 1808–1830, was the Judge at nisi prius 
in the case of Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541 (K.B. 1824).  
52. Haire v. Wilson, 9 B & C 643, 645 (K.B. 1829) (Lord Tenterden CJ); see 
also Fisher v. Clement, 10 B & C 472, 475 (K.B. 1830) (Lord Tenterden 
CJ). According to Littledale J in Haire v. Wilson, “[i]f the tendency of the 
publication was injurious to the plaintiff, then the law will presume that 
the defendant, by publishing it, intended to produce that injury which it 
was calculated to effect.” 9 B & C at 645.  
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that intention could be presumed from the defamatory nature of the 
expression itself—virtually eliminating the scienter element, unless the 
defendant raised a defence.53 
In 1838, when Lord Cottenham LC came to decide Millington v. 
Fox the authorities suggesting a scienter requirement at law were thus 
far from compelling.54 Indeed, writing in 1839, having reviewed the 
reported common law cases, one commentator summed up the position 
as follows: 
From these authorities it may be considered as clearly established, 
that the exclusive enjoyment of a particular sign, mark or label, 
is the subject of a legal right, and that an action at law may be 
brought for an invasion of the right, even though no special 
damage have been sustained thereby.55 
While it was true that some of the Chancery cases, such as Knott 
v. Morgan, had operated under the assumption that common law 
required a showing of scienter, that assumption was not obviously well-
founded.56 
2. The Nature of the Action and the Role of the Declaration 
Whatever the reports of the cases at common law said, one might 
have thought a requirement of scienter was self-evident for at least two 
other reasons: either because (i) the action at common law was said to 
derive from the action for deceit, where such scienter was required; and 
 
53. The defendant’s intention was to be inferred “from the libel itself.” Fisher, 
10 B & C at 476 (Bayley J). Accordingly, Lord Tenterden CJ made the 
presumption appear to be irrebuttable when he observed that “a person 
who publishes matter injurious to the character of another must be con–
sidered, in point of law, to have intended the consequences resulting from 
that act.” Id. at 475.  
54. Ludlow & Jenkins, supra note 26, at 10–12 (“In each of these four cases 
[Singleton, Skyes, Morison, and Blofeld] expressions occur indicating that 
some of the judges thought the action to be founded upon the defendant’s 
fraud. . . . [I]n none of them was there any necessity for strict accuracy of 
expression. . . . [I]n several of the cases successful fraud upon any one does 
not appear to have been proved.”). The third case referenced, Morison v. 
Salmon, 2 Man. & Gr. 385 (C.P., in banco 1841), was decided on January 
14, 1841, about three years after Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338 (Ch. 
1838). 
55. Piracy of Marks or Signs of Merchants and Traders, 22 L. Mag. Q. Rev. 
Juris. 148, 148–50 (1839) (discussing the account of the Gloucestershire 
Clothier’s case in the report of Southern v. How, Poph 143 (K.B. 1618); 
Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541 (K.B. 1824); and Blofeld v. Payne, 4 B. & 
Ad. 410 (K.B. 1833)). 
56. See Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213, 217–18 (Ch. 1836). 
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(ii) the declaration—the document in which a plaintiff described the 
wrongful act for which he sought recompense—ritually referred to 
scienter. However, as of 1838, there was no settled view as to the 
character of the common law action for Infringing traders’ marks; and 
the declaration was a poor guide to the substantive legal requirements. 
By the time of Millington, the character of the action for trade mark 
infringement had not been seriously addressed in any of the cases, and 
the commentaries were far from unanimous. For the most part, the 
question of categorisation fell to the many abridgments of the law, and 
the task had been to find a place for the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
within the framework of actions. There was no question that this was 
an action on the case, but this was a very broad field, encompassing 
much of what we would now regard as “tort law.” Some authors placed 
the case under the category of deceit. Most notably this was the 
classification in Sir John Comyns’s digest of 1762.57 Under the heading 
“Action upon the Case for a Deceipt” Comyns provided a sub-category, 
“Or other falsity,” where he stated, such action would lie “if a Clothier 
sell bad cloths, upon which he put the mark of another, who made good 
cloths.”58 In contrast, other treatises placed the Gloucestershire 
Clothier’s Case under other rubrics: for example, merely as a 
miscellaneous “Actions on the case,”59 or, in one instance, under the 
heading “Actions on the Case for Injuries to a Man’s Person, Property, 
Right, or Privilege.”60 
In interpreting these classifications, it is important to recall the 
divergences in the accounts of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
provided by the different reports of Southern v. How. Comyns cites the 
description of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case in Sir George Croke’s 
 
57. Sir John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England 179 (1762). The 
same text is contained in the fifth edition. 1 Sir John Comyns, A Digest 
of the Laws of England 351 (Anthony Hammond ed., 5th ed. 1822). 
See also John Lilly, The Practical Register: Or, A General 
Abridgment of the Law, as it is now Practised in the Several 
Courts of Chancery, King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer 
464 (1719) (citing Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468, 471 (K.B. 1618)) 
(categorizing the case as deceit, but treating it as availing the purchaser not 
the trade mark owner). 
58. Comyns (1762), supra note 57, at 179 (citing Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 
468, 471 (K.B. 1618)). 
59. 1 T. Cunningham, A New and Complete Law Dictionary, or, 
General Abridgment of the Law (1764); see also 1 Knightley 
D’Anvers, A General Abridgment of the Common Law 202 (1705) 
(referring to all three reports of Southern v. How under “Actions Upon 
the Case . . . (N) For what (a) Things it Lies”). 
60. 1 Matthew Bacon & Henry Gwillim, A New Abridgment of the 
Law 82 (6th ed. 1807). 
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report, where it was stated the action would lie in favour of the deceived 
purchaser rather than the clothier with whose mark the reputation was 
associated.61 It is a mistake therefore to think of Comyns as classifying 
trade mark infringement at all, and entirely unsurprising that he treats 
what was established the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case as deceit. The 
report of Southern v. How that described the Gloucestershire Clothier’s 
Case as establishing a right of the trader to bring proceedings is that 
designated “Popham.”62 The digests that refer to this report do not 
designate the action for misuse of another’s trade mark as one for deceit. 
As of 1838, then, the view that the action for trade mark infringement 
at common law was inextricably tethered to the action for deceit—a 
view that would come to prevail amongst judges in the middle of the 
century—had yet to be established. 
With respect to the declaration, it is true both that the form of 
declaration was a crucial facet of procedure at common law63 and that 
these mentioned scienter. For example, the declaration in Sykes v. Sykes 
had alleged: 
[D]efendants, knowing the premises, and contriving, &c., did 
wrongfully, knowing, and fraudulently, against the will and 
without the licence and consent of the plaintiff, make a great 
quantity of shot-belts and powder-flasks, and cause them to be 
marked with the words “Sykes Patent,” in imitation of the said 
 
61. Comyns (1762), supra note 57, at 179; Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468, 
471 (K.B. 1618). 
62. Southern v. How, Poph. 143 (K.B. 1618). The preface to the volume 
explains that the later cases from the times of James and Charles were not 
Sir John Popham’s reports but were “taken by judicious Pens.” Sir John 
Popham, Reports and Cases A3 (1656). 
63. The Preface to the sixth edition of Joseph Chitty’s book on pleading, 
published in 1836, for example, explained: 
[I]t is obvious that a very accurate knowledge of these subjects is 
essential not only to the professed Special Pleader and Barrister, 
but also to every Attorney, who is responsible to his client for the 
sufficiency of the proceedings, and who . . . by a timely suggestion 
might prevent a disastrous defeat, which would be as injurious to 
his own as his client’s interest, and discreditable to the 
administration of justice. 
 1 Joseph Chitty, Treatise on the Parties to Actions, and on 
Pleading A2 (6th ed. 1836). As we will see, some matters that were specified 
in a declaration had to be proved, but other matters were understood as 
surplusage, or defining parameters, for example, in relation to remedies. As 
an example, in Rodgers v. Nowill, 5 CB 109, 111 (C.P. 1847), the declaration 
alleged that Nowill manufactured “100,000 pen-knives and 100,000 pocket-
knives, in imitation of those prepared and manufactured and made by the 
plaintiffs,” but it was understood by all that these figures were notional. 
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mark so made by the plaintiff in that behalf as aforesaid, and in 
order to denote that the said shot-belts and powder-flasks, &c. 
were of the manufacture of the plaintiff; and did knowingly, 
wrongfully, and deceitfully sell, for their own lucre and gain, the 
said articles so made and marked as aforesaid, as and for shot-
belts and powder-flasks, &c. of the manufacture of the 
plaintiff . . . .64 
Nevertheless, these pleadings were not substantially different from 
those used in many actions on the case, and indeed in both patent and 
copyright cases.65 In relation to the latter, it was relatively clear that 
there would be liability irrespective of scienter.66 Thus, it was possible 
that these words were also unnecessary for a trade mark declaration 
and thus did not need to be established on the facts.67 As Chitty 
 
64. Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, 541 (K.B. 1824). 
65. For pleadings in copyright and patent cases, see W. Bohun, 
Declarations and Pleadings 232 (1733) (charging in the copyright 
pleading that the defendant “being not ignorant of the premises, but 
contriving and fraudulently intending”); 1 John Lilly, A Collection 
of Modern Entries: Or Select Pleadings in the Courts of King’s 
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer 64 (6th ed. 1792) (pleading 
for invasion of printing patent charges that the defendant, “not ignorant 
of the premises but contriving and intending to deceive and defraud 
them . . . of the benefit of the privilege aforesaid”); 8 John Wentworth, 
A Complete System of Pleading 431 (1798) (quoting Liardet v. 
Johnson, (K.B. 1780) (charging in invention patent that defendant “well 
knowing the premises, but contriving and fraudulently and maliciously 
intending to hurt, injure, and prejudice the said plaintiff”); 2 Joseph 
Chitty, Treatise on Pleading 579 (Henry Greening, ed., 7th ed. 1844) 
(charging defendant in invention patent case with “well knowing the 
premises, but contriving and wrongfully and injuriously intending to 
injure the plaintiff”); Wentworth, supra, at 434 (including entry 
concerning copyright in engravings that charged defendant with “well 
knowing the premises, but contriving and wrongfully and injuriously 
intending to injure and prejudice the said [plaintiff]”). 
66. In relation to literary copyright under the Statute of Anne, Lord 
Ellenborough CJ stated in 1807 that “[t]he intention to pirate is not 
necessary in an action of this sort; it is enough that the publication 
complained of is in substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another is 
prejudiced.” Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94, 98 (K.B. 1807). For patents, 
see Stead v. Anderson, 4 C. B. 806, 834 (C.P. 1847) (Wilde, CJ) (“[T]he 
action is maintainable in respect of what the defendant does, not of what 
he intends.”). For later confirmation that ignorance is no defense to either 
patent or copyright infringement, see Reade v. Lacy, 1 J. & H. 524, 526 
(Ch. 1861) (Page Wood, VC). 
67. For a parallel argument identifying a number of other actions on the case, 
as well as for assumpsit, where fraud is mentioned in the declaration but 
not required to be proved, see Bailiffs, etc. of Tewkesbury v. Diston, 6 
East, 438, 445–47 (K.B. 1805) (plaintiff’s counsel). 
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explained, “[i]f . . . a malicious or wrongful intent be unnecessarily 
stated, it need not be proved; and where there is evidence to prove the 
allegation, it may be advisable, in aggravation of damages, to state the 
defendant’s malicious intent.”68 Chitty cited in support a case where 
the declaration alleged deceit, but the plaintiff succeeded on the basis 
of a breach of a contractual warranty for which a showing of malice was 
not required.69 If the supposition is right that in 1838 at common law 
it was not necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate a defendant’s 
fraudulent intent, the mere fact it was ritually included in the plaintiffs’ 
declarations would not have been regarded as precluding relief. 
3. Lord Cottenham’s Understanding of the Law 
Cottenham LC’s judgment in Millington v. Fox needs to be 
understood in the light of his decision the previous year in Motley v. 
Downman.70 In that case, he offered a lengthy exegesis on the 
jurisdictional basis for Chancery’s intervention in trade mark cases. In 
doing so, he made clear that Chancery was acting in support of the 
common law: “The Court, when it interferes in cases of this sort, is 
exercising a jurisdiction over legal rights . . . the Court is only acting 
in aid of, and is only ancillary to, the legal right.”71 Lord Cottenham 
did nothing to suggest there was an independent equitable jurisdiction 
in relation to trade marks. 
Given this, we cannot read Millington as establishing a different 
test, or indeed basis, for equitable intervention. When Lord Cottenham 
LC declares that, even absent fraud, “the Plaintiffs [have a] right to the 
exclusive use of those names,” we should understand that this is how 
he understood the position at common law.72 This conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the case was fully argued, by impressive 
counsel, 73 over three days with judgment given on Saturday, March 24, 
 
68. 1 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading, and Parties to Actions 
390 (12th ed. 1855) (footnotes omitted). 
69. Williamson, 2 East, 446 (K.B. 1802) (noting that if the averment of 
knowledge and intent could be struck out and the plaintiff could succeed, 
there was no need for it to be proved). 
70. 3 My. & Cr. 1, 14 (Ch. 1837). 
71. Id. at 14. 
72. Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 351–52 (Ch. 1838). 
73. Millington, 3 My. & Cr. at 350 (identifying Wigram and Russell for 
Millington, and the Solicitor General, Rolfe, and Stuart for Fox Brothers). 
Wigram and Stuart would later be Vice-Chancellors. See W. R. Williams, 
Wigram, Sir James, in 61 Dictionary of National Biography 198 
(Sidney Lee ed., 1900). Rolfe, elevated under the title Lord Cranworth, 
would be Lord Chancellor. See G.F. Russell Barker, supra note 21, at 158–
61. 
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1838.74 According to a recent account of his judicial approach, Lord 
Cottenham “vigorously researched and analyzed precedents which 
could have any bearing on [a] case.” 75 Moreover, the Lord Chancellor 
gave off no hint that he was conscious that he might be doing anything 
remotely unexpected.76 Indeed, it is telling in that regard that he said 
the only reason he reserved judgment was to consider the question of 
costs.77 It is also worth noting that the parties to the litigation did not 
seem to regard the conclusion as surprising. In three previous 
proceedings brought by Millington concerning the very same marks, 
including one against a very sizeable Sheffield firm,78 the proceedings 
had been settled, the defendants agreeing not to use the signs that 
Millington had claimed, to pay Millington’s costs, and to compensate 
it for its losses.79 Indeed, the Fox Bros. had offered to cease using the 
 
74. The arguments were given on March 16, 17, and 23. Millington, 3 My. & 
Cr. at 338, 351.  
75. Fiona R. Burns, Lord Cottenham and the Court of Chancery, 24 J. Legal 
Hist. 187, 200 (2003). 
76. It might be said that this was precisely what one would expect of a judge 
who was doing something radical. For example, Lord Cottenham prefaced 
another of his time-honoured decisions by denying its significance. See 
Prince Albert v. Strange, 13 Jur. (OS) 109, 111 (Ch. 1850) (“The import–
ance which has been attached to this case arises entirely from the exalted 
situation of the plaintiff, and cannot be referred to any difficulty in the 
case itself. The precise facts may not have occurred before; but those facts 
clearly fall within the established principles, and the application of them 
is not attended with any difficulty.”). 
77. Millington, 3 My. & Cr. at 351–52. 
78. William Greaves & Sons had been established in the late eighteenth 
century, but by the 1830s was thriving, having built the “Sheaf Works” in 
1823 at a cost of £30,000 so as to integrate on a single site all the processes 
necessary to transform iron imported from Sweden into finished goods. 
Alfred Gatty, Sheffield Past and Present 212–13 (1873) 
(identifying the necessary processes as “converting, casting, forging, tilling, 
rolling, grinding, and completing”). Greaves was regarded as the largest 
manufacturer of edge-tools, boasting a trade worth £80,000 per annum with 
the United States. See Sheaf Works, Sheffield Indep., May 20, 1869 (on 
success); Sheffield’s Growth: Interesting Links with the Past, Sheffield 
Daily Tel., Apr. 29, 1913 (identifying Greaves as the largest manufacturer 
of edge tools). The firm dissolved in 1850, but its name was used by its 
successors, Thomas Turton and Frederick T Mappin. See Sheffield Daily 
Tel., Mar. 9, 1906 (reporting turnover with United States in 1850 when 
Greaves & Son was sold). For images, see K.C. Barraclough, Sheffield 
Steel (1976) 21, 62–63 (providing images of Sheaf Works in 1850, 1855, 
and 1858). 
79. See Millington v. Greaves, TNA: C33/854 f. 2670v (Aug. 13, 1833) (interim 
injunction); Answer, Greaves, TNA: C33/854 (Nov. 20, 1833); Millington 
v. Greaves, TNA: C33/863 f. 1190 (July 17, 1834) (perpetual injunction); 
Millington v. Smith, TNA: C13/1861/23 (Feb. 19, 1834) (bill); Millington 
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disputed names CROWLEY and MILLINGTON even before Millington 
commenced proceedings, so the award of an injunction would likely 
have been anticipated.80 Finally, we might note that the immediate 
reaction from the newspapers and legal press to the decision does not 
suggest that “the profession was taken by surprise.”81 
Seen in this context, Millington was far from radical when it was 
decided. However, it soon came to be seen as such because, four years 
later, the common law courts established—at least to most peoples’ 
satisfaction—that scienter needed to be alleged and proved to sustain 
 
v. Smith, TNA: C33/861 f. 606v (Feb. 25, 1834) (interim injunction); 
Smith’s Answer, Smith, TNA C33/861 (June 20, 1834); Smith, TNA: 
C33/863 f. 1223r (July 30, 1834) (perpetual injunction); Steel. Crowley and 
Crowley Millington Steel, Sheffield Indep., Nov. 8, 1834 (also Nov. 15, 
1834) (setting out terms of agreement, that both Greaves and Smith pay 
compensation, Millington’s costs and to permit Crowley Millington & Co’s 
advertising of the outcome of the litigation). A third complaint against 
William Oxley was settled on terms that Oxley pay compensation and 
advertise the outcome. Sheffield Indep., Nov. 8, 1834. 
80. See Millington, 3 My. & Cr. at 338 (“[T]he Defendants stated . . . that 
they did not intend to use them again . . . .”).  
81. In fact, Lord Cottenham, LC, reiterated the position three years later, on 
February 5, 1841 in Seeley v. Fisher, in which the original publisher of a 
work now in the public domain objected to the defendant publishing a 
new edition of the work. 11 Sim. 581, 581–83 (Ch. 1841). Although best 
known through the report in 11 Sim. 581, the fuller report in the Legal 
Observer states that Lord Cottenham, LC, explained: 
The question is not absolutely a question of fraud, because a party 
may represent that he is publishing or selling what truly belongs 
to another without intending fraud; but if he does so, the other 
party has a right to the protection of this court . . . . [I]t must be 
made to appear to be an intentional misrepresentation, and 
calculated to lead others to believe that when they are buying 
that which the defendant offers for sale they are buying that which 
is, in fact, the exclusive property of the plaintiffs. This case . . . 
comes within the principle of those cases which have been decided 
upon tradesmen using the mark of the party complaining. . . . [I]t 
is a representation that he is holding out to the world that he is 
selling that which the other party alone has the right to sell, and 
has the right to be protected against the representation that 
others are selling those goods to persons, who buy them under the 
idea that they are buying the goods of the plaintiffs’. That is a 
principle which this Court acts upon by protecting parties by 
injunction, and it is a principle also which courts of law will 
enforce by giving damages, and, even where no injury has been 
sustained, by supporting the action, at least where it appears such 
a course of conduct has been pursued by the defendants. 
 Seeley v. Fisher, 21 Leg. Obs. 465, 475–76 (1841). 
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a common law action.82 The action was indeed an action on the case 
“for deceit” and an “intention to deceive” was a core component.83 The 
key case was Crawshay v. Thompson. 
 
C. Crawshay and the Requirement of Intent to Deceive at Common Law 
Crawshay v. Thompson was a dispute between two rival iron–
masters of South Wales and concerned the stamping of bars of iron.84 
The claimant stamped their iron,85 which they exported to Turkey, 
“WC.”86 The defendant had been found shipping iron to Turkey marked 
“W•.”87 It argued that it, in doing so, it was copying a mark used on 
iron of a particular type that was of Russian origin, and thus that there 
was no fraudulent intent to deceive purchasers of the iron into thinking 
they were getting Crawshay’s iron.88 Crawshay had initially sought 
 
82. See, e.g., Francis H. Upton, A Treatise on the Law of Trade 
Marks 204–08 (1860). 
83. Crawshay v. Thompson, 4 Man. & G. 357, 383–85 (C.P. 1842). 
84. Id. at 357, 360–61.  
85. Id. at 357–59. William Crawshay II, the owner of an ironworks in Cyfartha 
in Glamorgan in Wales (in today’s terms, Merthyr Tydfil), was an “iron-
master” rather than an “iron manufacturer” (like Crowley). See G.C. Boase, 
Crawshay, William (1788-1867), in 13 Dictionary of National 
Biography 63 (Leslie Stephen ed., 1897); Paula Watson & Sonya Wynne, 
Crowley, Sir Ambrose (1658-1713), of Greenwich, Kent, Hist. 
Parliament, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1690-17 
15/member/crowley-sir-ambrose-1658-1713 [https://perma.cc/896Y-VPU 
P] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). The firm produced bar iron, rather than 
converting bar-iron into steel or finished products. John P. Addis, The 
Crawshay Dynasty 15 (1957). The Cyfartha works dated back to the late 
eighteenth century, when Richard Crawshay, William’s grandfather, had 
been a partner in the firm that owned the works. Id. at 15–16. In 1803 it 
had been observed that the works were “by far the largest in this Kingdom; 
probably, indeed, the largest in Europe; and in that case, as far as we know, 
the largest in the world.” Id. at 16 (quoting 1 B.H. Malkin, The Scenery, 
Antiquities and Biography of South Wales 175 (1804)). William 
Crawshay II had taken over as proprietor in 1834 on the death of his father 
William Crawshay I.  
86. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 357–58. 
87. Id. at 361–63. The defendants, one of whom was Crawshay’s brother-in-
law, Alderman Thompson, operated a nearby ironworks at Penydarran. 
Penydarren Ironworks, Coflein (Feb. 20, 2020), https://coflein.gov.uk/ 
en/site/34113/details/penydarren-ironworks [https://perma.cc/GK4F-
CN6F]; Margaret Taylor Stewart, Merthyr’s Lost Landmarks: Penydarren 
House, Melting Pot (July 9, 2018), https://www.merthyr-history.com/ 
?p=2057 [https://perma.cc/SG6C-KGBX]. 
88. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 362–63. Counsel for Thompson asserted that 
“[t]here must be an actual copying, coupled with a fraudulent intention,” 
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injunctive relief in Chancery,89 but Shadwell VC declined to grant the 
order, allowing Crawshay to retain the bill in Chancery while he estab–
lished his legal rights.90 Crawshay’s declaration was in the usual form, 
alleging that Thompson had “wrongfully, knowingly and fraudulently” 
stamped the iron and then wrongfully, knowingly and fraudulently sold 
the iron so stamped “as and for and under the false colour and pretence 
that the same were respectively bars of iron of the genuine manufacture 
of the plaintiff . . . .”91 At trial before Tindal CJ, the Lord Chief Justice 
left two issues to the jury.92 The first was whether the marks were so 
similar as to be likely to deceive and thus to injure Crawshay’s sales. 
The second—and more relevant for us—was whether the intention of 
the defendants in using the mark was for the purpose of supplanting 
the plaintiff, or done in the usual course of trade, and in execution of 
foreign orders sent to their house. Tindal CJ’s view was that unless 
such a fraudulent intention were established, the defendant would not 
be liable. After less than an hour, the jury returned a verdict for the 
defendants.93 
Crawshay sought to have the verdict set aside by the court sitting 
in banc.94 Recognising that the issue of knowledge and intention was 
both complicated and important, the Court granted a rule nisi for a 
new trial.95 Four months later, on 24 May, the issue was fully aired.96 
Serjeant Shee, for Crawshay, argued that the second question should 
not have been put to the jury: 
[T]he motive or intention of the defendants in using the mark was 
immaterial, if the resemblance in fact existed, and the defendants 
were aware of it. If the defendants had received orders in express 
terms to mark their iron similarly to the plaintiffs, or in such a 
way as was calculated to make their iron pass for the plaintiff’s, 
and if they had executed such orders, they would have been liable 
 
and that no fraud had been intended by Thompson. Crawshay v. Thompson, 
20 Leg. Obs. 369, 382 (Ch. 1840). Rather, he explained, these were Russian 
characters long used by them. Id. 
89. TNA C13/1286/9 (July 15, 1840) (bill).  
90. Crawshay, 20 Leg. Obs. at 382–83. 
91. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 357–60. 
92. Id. at 363.  
93. Id. Times, Dec. 21, 1841 (reporting that the jury retired at 18.40 and 
delivered its verdict at 19.30) 
94. See Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 364. 
95. Id. at 364–66. Times, Jan. 14, 1841. 
96. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 357; Crawshay v. Thompson, Times, May 27, 
1842 at 8 (C.P. 1842). 
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to this action, no matter from what motive they might have 
acted.97 
On 26 May 1842, the Court ruled that the rule for a new trial should 
be discharged, and thus affirmed the verdict in the trial.98 Coltman J 
referred to the plaintiff’s declaration as key to the case: 
The declaration alleges in substance that the defendants . . . sold 
those bars, with the intention that they should pass in the market 
as bearing the plaintiff’s mark. That allegation gives rise to the 
questions left by my lord to the jury . . . whether the mark was 
used by the defendants with the intention to deceive. It appears 
to me that an intention to deceive is a necessary ingredient in this 
case. The intention is for the jury; and fraud must be made out 
by proof of an intention existing in the mind of the party . . . .99 
Interestingly, he seems to have thought that such intention would flow 
from knowledge of similarity: 
If . . . the defendants were aware of the resemblance, and that it 
was calculated to mislead, the plaintiff would have been entitled 
to the verdict, for the intention to deceive would have been 
manifest.100 
Maule J likewise began with the pleadings,101 noting from the 
declaration: 
[T]he gist of the action is the selling iron of the defendants’ 
manufacture as and for iron of the plaintiff’s manufacture; and 
that this allegation would have been sustained if it had been 
shewn that the defendants had sold their iron to their corres–
pondents for the purpose of being retailed, as of the plaintiff’s 
manufacture.102  
However, Maule J observed that the declaration also alleged that the 
defendants knowingly manufactured their iron with a mark, in imitation 
of that used by the plaintiff, in order to denote that such iron was 
manufactured by the plaintiff. With respect to this allegation he 
commented: 
 
97. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 372. 
98. Id. at 388. 
99. Id. at 377. 
100. Id. at 377–78. 
101. Id. at 379–80. 
102. Id. at 380. 
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I think the declaration might have been good without that 
allegation; and if that be so, then the question arises, whether, 
that allegation having been inserted in the declaration, it would 
be necessary to prove it; and I think such proof would be 
necessary; for it is an allegation of a particular mode of effecting 
the wrong complained of, and ought therefore to be proved as 
alleged.103 
Cresswell J in contrast focused not just on the declaration but also 
on the basis for the action. Relying on Comyns Digest,104 he suggested 
that the action was to be understood as an action for deceit and inferred 
from this that “the declaration regularly ought to charge that the 
defendant was sciens of the matter by which he deceived; and that he 
did it falsò et fraudulenter.”105 Furthermore, Cresswell J referred back 
to Popham’s report of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, noting that 
“the gist of the action appears to have been the use of his mark ‘on 
purpose to deceive.’”106 
The varied emphasis placed on the declaration by the different 
judges in Common Pleas might have left room for dispute as to whether 
the decision in Crawshay really established that intent to deceive was 
a necessary component of the action. Indeed, some would later argue 
that Maule J, in particular, had hinted that an action could have been 
sustained successfully by Crawshay if his counsel had formulated the 
declaration differently.107 However, that is not how Crawshay was 
subsequently understood, either by courts of law or equity. Indeed, over 
the following decades, courts of different stripes seemed to take for 
granted the view that the common law regarded the action for trade 
mark infringement as a mutation of the action for deceit and, relatedly, 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 385. Ludlow and Jenkyns took issue with Cresswell J’s elision of the 
trade mark action with that of deceit. Henry Ludlow & Henry Jenkyns, 
A Treatise on the Law of Trade-Marks and Trade-Names 14–15 
(1873). This, they said, occurred purely by accident, because there was no 
distinctive name in the English system under which such property could be 
placed. Id. at 14. Indeed, in the next big common law case, Rodgers v. 
Nowill, the issue was raised in argument by Maule J, Montagu Chambers 
responding that “[t]here is no other title under which such an action shall 
be classed.” 5 C. B. 109, 116 (C.P. 1847). 
105. Crawshay, 4 Man. & G. at 385 (emphasis added). 
106. Id. at 385–86 (quoting Southern v. How, Poph. 143, 144 (K.B. 1618)). 
107. Francis H. Upton, A Treatise on the Law of Trade Marks 206 
(1860) (“In the case of Crawshay vs. Thompson . . . it was held by Mr. 
Justice Maule, that the declaration of the plaintiff would have been good, 
without the express allegation of the scienter, which it contained.”). 
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required a demonstration of scienter.108 In fact, this “origin story” of 
the law became so engrained that when the House of Lords decided 
Derry v. Peek towards the end of the century,109 commentators felt 
obliged to argue that the law of trade marks was by then so well 
established that it had acquired an independent character so that 
developments in the law of deceit were no longer of relevance to it.110 
D. Millington Becomes a Loose-End 
The ruling in Crawshay placed the Chancery judges in a difficult 
position. On the one hand they could apply Motley v. Downman and 
the principle that Chancery operated only in support of legal right, and 
thus require plaintiffs to establish scienter. Alternatively, they could 
adhere to Millington v. Fox, but doing so would cause the rules 
applicable at law and equity to diverge. Faced with this dilemma, the 
immediate response of the Chancery judges was to distance themselves 
from Millington.111 
The boldest examples of such distancing came from the judgments 
of Lord Langdale MR. In Knott v. Morgan, two years prior to 
 
108. See, e.g., Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 De G. J. & S. 185, 199 (Ch. 1863) (Lord 
Westbury, LC); Douthwaite v. Wimble, Times, Aug. 17, 1867, at 10–11 
(Assizes, Martin B) (concerning two manufacturers of ink, the plaintiff 
being nonsuited because he had not established “willful infringement”); 
Hickisson v. Ashton, Times, Dec. 20, 1875 (Exch. 1875) (nisi prius) (des–
cribing a case heard one month after the Judicature Act came into operation 
between two sellers of ink who claimed to be successors to John Bond and 
Henry Bond and in which Cleasby B instructed jury to decide whether (i) 
a general resemblance between label and packs (for ink) and (ii) “whether 
there was such a particular resemblance between them as showed an 
intention to deceive and as was likely to mislead”). 
109. 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889) (stating that in an action for deceit, a 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant was conscious of the misleading 
character of the statement in issue). 
110. See D. M. Kerly, The Law of Trade-Marks, Trade-Name, and 
Merchandise Marks 384 & n.r (1894); D. M. Kerly, The Law of 
Trade-Marks, Trade-Name, and Merchandise Marks 451–52 & n.u 
(2d ed. 1901). 
111. That said, there were also some attempts to plot an intermediate course by 
retaining but diluting the scienter requirement, for example, by appealing 
to “objective fault” or employing presumptions. It was sometimes said that 
an intent to deceive could be inferred from the fact that a defendant’s sign 
so closely resembled the plaintiff’s as to be “calculated to deceive,” the latter 
phrase, itself confusingly implying scienter, but in fact understood by most 
lawyers as merely concerned with the closeness in resemblance between a 
plaintiff and defendant’s marks. See, e.g., Bass v. Marlow & Beebe, Irish 
Times, May 19, 1850 (Ir MR) (inferring intent from closeness of resem–
blance); McDowell v. Standard Oil, AC 632, 637 (K.B. 1927) (“calculated” 
does not mean “intended to” but “likely” or “reasonably likely” to deceive). 
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Millington, he had refused to discharge an injunction granted ex parte, 
clearly working on the assumption that fraud had to be (and had been) 
established.112 Just over six months following the decision of the Court 
of Common Pleas in Crawshay, in Perry v. Truefitt,113 a case concerning 
the designation “MEDICATED MEXICAN BALM” for hair-grease, 
Lord Langdale MR quickly reasserted his previous understanding of the 
law. Denying the plaintiff relief (on other grounds), Lord Langdale 
rejected any suggestion that there could be property “merely in a name 
or mark”, while indicating he had 
no doubt that another person has not a right to use that name or 
mark for the purposes of deception, and in order to attract to 
himself that course of trade, or that custom, which, without that 
improper act, would have flowed to the person who first used, or 
was alone in the habit of using the particular name or mark.114 
Referring to Millington, Lord Langdale MR said he was “not aware that 
any previous case carried the principle to that extent.”115 
Such an explicit criticism of a decision of the head of the Court of 
Chancery might seem rather startling, but the secondary literature 
indicates that, prior to the 1850s, it was not unusual for the various 
Chancery judges—the three Vice-Chancellors as well as the Master of 
the Rolls—to disregard prior decisions, especially recent ones, and even 
those of a Lord Chancellor.116 Moreover, there was little immediate 
 
112. Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213, 219 (Lord Langdale MR) (Ch. 1836) (“The 
. . . question is, whether the Defendant fraudulently imitated the title and 
insignia used by the Plaintiffs for the purpose of injuring them in their 
trade; and, upon the affidavits and evidence before me, I have not the 
least doubt that the Defendant did intend to induce the public to believe 
that the omnibus which he painted and appointed, so as to resemble the 
carriages of the Plaintiffs, was, in fact, an omnibus belonging to the 
Plaintiffs . . . .”). 
113. 6 Beav. 66 (Ch. 1842). 
114. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
115. Id. 
116. According to W.H.D. Winder, “[i]t was only slowly that a decision of the 
Lord Chancellor came to be held binding on a Vice-Chancellor, the Master 
of the Rolls or a Judge of the High Court.” W.H.D. Winder, Precedent in 
Equity, 57 Law Q. Rev. 245, 264 (1941). Victorian courts, in general, 
followed precedent, particularly in matters of property, but from time to 
time judges would deviate from those they regarded as problematic. John 
H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 207–12 (5th 
ed. 2019). The weight of different precedents depended on a host of 
considerations. Indeed, Sir John Baker argues that the idea of precedent 
as a “duty of repeating errors” was a result of the introduction of a 
hierarchical system of appellate courts in the Victorian period. Id. In any 
event, much turned on the age of decisions and how often they had been 
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potential for personal embarrassment: by 1843, the position of Lord 
Chancellor (being a political appointment) was held by Lord Lyndhurst 
LC.117 In any case, Lord Langdale had differed from Lord Cottenham 
publicly before, and the two never had a warm relationship.118 
In the decade following Perry v. Truefitt, a number of cases in 
Chancery would state the legal position in terms that appeared to 
require a demonstration of scienter, while the Court of Common Pleas 
reiterated the requirement as a matter of common law in Rodgers v. 
Nowill.119 Lord Langdale MR himself restated the position in Croft v. 
Day in 1843, and that restatement was quoted by Williams J when 
instructing the jury at nisi prius in the Rodgers case.120 In Franks v. 
Weaver in 1847, counsel for the plaintiff did not even bother to cite 
Millington v. Fox before Lord Langdale MR.121 In Edelsten v. Vick, 
Page-Wood VC stated: 
I agree with the argument on the part of the Defendants there 
must be an intention to deceive the public, or this Court will not 
interfere. That was established in Sykes v. Sykes (3 B. & C. 541), 
which was followed by the case of Crawshay v. Thompson (4 Man. 
& Gr. 357); and in this case the Defendants have not denied, in 
a satisfactory way, that they intended such a deception.122 
 
followed, and being a recent decision, Millington v. Fox had not yet 
acquired much weight. 
117. 1 Theodore Martin, A Life of Lord Lyndhurst: From Letters 
and Papers in Possession of His Family 219, 396–406 (2d ed. 1884). 
118. In Cottenham’s first stint as Lord Chancellor, 1836–41, the two judges 
did not see eye to eye, with Langdale criticising Cottenham’s bill 
proposing certain Chancery reforms. See 1 J.B. Atlay, The Victorian 
Chancellors 398 (1906); 2 Thomas Duffus Hardy, Memoirs of the 
Right Honourable Henry Lord Langdale 256 (1852) (“Between 
Lord Cottenham and Lord Langdale there was at one time a want of 
cordiality on the part of the former . . . .”). 
119. Rodgers v. Nowill, 5 CB 109, 124–125 (C.P. 1846) (Wilde CJ); Id. at 126 
(Coltman J) (“[N]o man has a right to sell goods of his own manufacture, 
upon a false and deceitful representation that they are of the manufacture 
of another . . . .”). 
120. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 88, 89 (Ch. 1843); Rodgers v. Nowill, 6 Hare 325, 337 
n.1 (C.P. 1846) (“The learned Judge, in directing the jury, read the 
judgment of Lord Langdale in Croft v. Day . . . as expressing the law 
applicable to the case.”). 
121. Franks v. Weaver, 10 Beav. 297, 300 (Ch. 1847) (Kindersley, for plaintiff) 
(citing Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen 213 (Ch. 1836), Gout v. Aleploglu, 6 
Beav. 69 (Ch. 1833); and Croft, 7 Beav. 88 (Ch. 1843)). 
122. 11 Hare 78, 84 (Ch. 1853). There was no mention of Millington in Edelsten. 
For another case that seems to assume a need for a showing of intent to 
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The reference to Sykes and Crawshay clearly indicates that, in 1853, 
Page-Wood VC was convinced that the rules applicable in equity did, 
and should, correspond with those at law, and it was by then clearly 
established that this required an intent to deceive. Moreover, two decis–
ions of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, which had been established in 
1851—Burgess v. Burgess123 and Allsopp v. Fraser—also implied a 
requirement of fraud.124 
The doubts raised over the authority of Millington were noted by 
commentators. In 1851, the barrister Thomas Turner, writing in The 
Jurist, noted that “no subsequent case has, up to the present time, I 
believe, followed” the decision in Millington.125 In 1853, another 
observed, “the authority of [Millington v. Fox] has been doubted.”126 An 
article on trade mark infringement in 1859 explicitly stated that of the 
 
deceive, see Bass v. Marlow & Beebe, Irish Times, May 19, 1850 (Ir MR) 
(inferring intent from closeness of resemblance). 
123. 3 De G. M. & G. 896 (C.A. in Ch. 1853). In Burgess, the Court of Appeal 
in Chancery reversed a decision of Kindersley VC, refusing to award 
interim injunctive relief against the plaintiff’s own son, who like his father 
was involved in selling “essence of anchovies.” Id. at 903–04. Despite the 
plaintiff invoking Millington v. Fox, Lord Justice Knight Bruce suggested 
there needed to be evidence of fraud over and above the defendant’s use 
of his own name. Id.  
124. Allsopp v. Fraser, Morning Post, Dec. 20, 1853, at 11, Times, Dec. 20, 1852, 
at 8 (C.A. in Ch.). In Allsopp, the Court of Appeal in Chancery dissolved 
the injunction awarded by the Master of the Rolls, Knight Bruce LJ stating: 
“there did not appear sufficient ground to attribute any fraud, dishonesty, 
or wrong intention to [the defendant], though it must be admitted he had 
not acted prudently.” Times, Dec. 20, 1853, at 11. As Fraser was merely 
involved in supplying imperfect beer to another person (Coombes) who 
labelled it with Allsopp’s labels, this case might alternatively be viewed (or 
retrospectively explained) as a case of accessory liability. Id.  
125. Thomas Turner, Trades Marks, 14 Jurist 223 (1851). By this point, the 
closest a case had come to following Millington was probably Thorne v. 
Butcher, where the Vice-Chancellor is reported to have observed, “what 
degree of knowledge the defendants had of it did not signify.” Times, Jan. 
12, 1850 (Shadwell VC) (awarding an injunction where defendant had used 
the name TURNER AND COMPANY, WARRANTED claiming he was 
ignorant that it was a mark). Note also London and Provincial Law 
Assurance Co. v. London and Provincial Joint Stock Assurance Co, where 
Richard Bethell for the plaintiff argued that what mattered was the effect 
of the defendant’s representation, not its intention. Evening Mail, Nov. 10–
12, 1847 (citing Millington v. Fox, 17 L.J. 37 (Ch. 1838)). According to the 
newspaper report, Shadwell VC indicated that he accepted the proposition 
in principle, but because of the differences between the two names in issues 
and the short period in which the plaintiff had used its mark, ordered the 
motion to stand over giving the plaintiff leave to bring proceedings at law. 
London & Provincial L. Assurance Co., Evening Mail, Nov. 10–12, 1847. 
126. Untitled Article, 17 Jurist 141, 141 (1853). 
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“three things to be proved,” one was “that the imitation was purposely 
made with a fraudulent intent.”127 Giving evidence to a Parliamentary 
Select Committee,128 leading barrister William Hindmarch declared that 
all English law possessed was “a law to prevent cheats.”129 Rather than 
being a landmark, Millington now seemed like a road that would not be 
travelled. Millington was at best a loose-end, at worst a dead-end. 
II. Millington Becomes a Landmark: The Triumph of 
Strict Liability  
By the time William Hindmarch offered his account to the Select 
Committee on Merchandise Marks, however, the position was starting 
to change. An increasing number of decisions of the Vice-Chancellors 
had begun to treat Millington as the controlling authority. Over the 
following decades, it would become accepted orthodoxy that Chancery 
would grant injunctive relief where the effect of continued use of a mark 
by the defendant would be deceptive, irrespective of their intention. 
This section seeks to chart, and Part III attempts to explain, this volte 
face. 
The shift begins most visibly right at the end of 1857.130 In Welch 
v. Knott,131 the maker of aerated and mineral water which was sold 
under the name “Jacob Schweppe,”132 sought to maintain an interim 
injunction that had been granted against the defendant prohibiting it 
from selling its water in bottles marked “Schweppe.” The defendant’s 
answer had explained that he had taken in secondhand Schweppe 
bottles, as was the custom, and now that he understood Welch did not 
want these to be re-used, he would desist. The report indicates that in 
arguing for the plaintiff, Hugh Cairns (later, Lord Chancellor Cairns) 
 
127. Trade-Marks, 12 Chambers J. 218, 219 (1859). 
128. Select Committee on Trade Marks Bill and Merchandise Marks 
Bill, Minutes of Evidence, 1862, HC-12, at 128–55 (UK). 
129. Id. at 128, Q. 2757 (W. Hindmarch). 
130. See Welch v. Knott, 4 K & J 747, 751 (Ch. 1857) (Page-Wood VC) 
(indicating that the Vice Chancellor had already applied the rule in Millington 
v. Fox in the Bass case). However, the report in The Jurist is less specific on 
that point. 4 Jur. (N.S.) 330, 331. 
131. 4 K & J 747. 
132. Id. Welch and Evill brought proceedings in Chancery at least eight times 
in this period. See Welch v. Clayton, C15/347/W123 (1856), Times, June 
27, 1856, at 11; Welch v. Nevell, C15/347/W124 (1856), Times, June 27, 
1856, at 11; Welch v. Selman, Times, July 31, 1856, at 11; Welch v. Luntley, 
C15/347/W120 (1856); Welch v. Ray, C15/347/W135 (1856); Welch v. 
Staniforth, C15/229/R46; Welch v. Cook, C15/348/W150; Welch v. Black, 
C15/347/W139. 
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primarily contended that defendant was guilty of fraudulent use of the 
bottles with intent to deceive, but argued in the alternative that such 
fraudulent intent was not required in the light of Millington.133 The 
report does not reference any of the common-law authorities. Although 
dissolving an injunction initially granted on the basis that the evidence 
was insufficient,134 Page-Wood VC articulated his understanding of the 
law of trade mark infringement in terms quite different from those in 
his judgment in Edelsten v. Vick only four years before: 
 That the Defendant would not be entitled to use the Plaintiffs’ 
bottles in such a manner as, in fact, to mislead the public, 
although there might be no intention on his part to mislead, is 
clear. In Millington v. Fox . . . Lord Cottenham felt satisfied that, 
in using the Plaintiffs’ trade marks, the Defendants had no 
intention to mislead the public; yet, inasmuch as the public were, 
in fact, misled, he held that the Plaintiffs were entitled to a 
perpetual injunction. It was not sufficient for the Defendants to 
say that they used the marks in ignorance of their being the 
Plaintiffs’ trade marks. 
 How far that doctrine is capable of being reconciled with cases 
at law in which the scienter has been held to be essential in order 
to enable the Plaintiff to recover, it is not material to consider. 
In this Court the rule is clear as laid down in Millington v. Fox.135 
Two years later, Page-Wood VC sought to answer the question he 
had posed as to whether Millington could be reconciled with the cases 
at law.136 In Taylor v. Degatau, a case to which we will return, he was 
clear—the rules were indeed different: 
The law as to trade marks stood differently at law and in equity. 
The law regarded the question as simply one of fraud by a 
defendant in fraudulently injuring the plaintiff. A Court of equity 
looked further, considering a trade mark as a species of property, 
not like copyright, but which a man might have in his name, 
which was valuable to him, and which no one else had a right to 
 
133. See Welch v. Knott, 4 K & J at 749–50. See also J. A. Hamilton, Cairns, 
Hugh McCalmont, in 8 Dictionary of National Biography 217–20 
(Leslie Stephen ed., 1886). 
134. Knott, 4 K & J at 750–52. The evidence concerned a single sale of 12 bottles 
of mineral water, and only 5 of the bottles had carried the SCHWEPPE 
mark. Id. at 747–48. The Vice-Chancellor concluded that “it is manifest Mr. 
Chapple must have known that the Defendant was selling this soda water 
as his own, and not Schweppe’s . . . .” Id. at 752. 
135. Id. at 751 (citing Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 352 (Ch. 1838)). 
136. Id.  
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use. Putting it on other grounds, this Court protected the right 
because the owner had so established his character that it was an 
injury to him if another party, whether done fraudulently or not, 
were to be allowed to pass off or lead the world to suppose that 
certain goods bearing his name had been really manufactured by 
him, when they had not.137 
It was not just Page-Wood VC who took this view. In Clement v. 
Maddick,138 in which an injunction was awarded protecting the title of 
a newspaper “Bell’s Life” (which sold for 5d) from incorporation in the 
defendant’s “Penny Bell’s Life and Sporting News” (which sold for 1d), 
Stuart VC explained: 
I consider this application in the light of one to support a right 
to property. It has been argued on behalf of the defendants that, 
unless some fraudulent intention is made out, the plaintiffs are 
not entitled to relief. Lord Cottenham, however, in a judgment 
delivered by him (Millington v. Fox . . . ) has expressed a totally 
different opinion, to the effect that when a trade mark has been 
made use of, even innocently and unconsciously, to the injury of 
another, that party is entitled to the interference and protection 
of this court.139 
Perhaps most tellingly, in 1861, Millington v. Fox was recognised 
as being binding on a court of Chancery in a decision of a common law 
court in Dixon v. Fawcus.140 This rather strange situation arose because 
of the intersection between a contract to supply goods and the rules on 
trade mark infringement. The plaintiff had agreed to supply the defend–
ant with goods bearing a particular mark specified by the defendant, 
“Ramsey.” A maker of bricks who had been using the mark “Ramsey” 
brought proceedings in Chancery against Dixon, claiming an injunction 
 
137. The Morality of Trade, Manchester Guardian, Mar. 25, 1859, at 4. See 
also Ainsworth v. Walmsley, where Page-Wood VC stated: “The use, there–
fore, of the name of another manufacturer, whether done [with] scienter or 
not, is an interference with his business which this Court will interpose to 
prevent, on the ground that the Defendant is endeavouring to pass off the 
goods of his own, or somebody else’s manufacture, as the manufacture of the 
Plaintiff.” L.R. 1 Eq. 518, 525 (1865/66).  
138. (Ch. 1859) (Stuart VC) 33 LT 117, 5 Jur. (N.S.) 592. 
139. 33 LT 117 (citing Millington, 3 My. & Cr. 338), 5 Jur. (N.S.) 592. Counsel 
for the defendant, James Bacon had relied on Burgess v. Burgess, saying 
“the LJ refused the injunction on the very ground that no fraud had been 
shown.” 33 LT 117 (citing Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G. 896 (C.A. 
in Ch. 1853)). 
140. Dixon v. Fawcus, 3 El & El 537 (C.P. 1861), 546 (citing Millington, 3 My. 
& Cr. 338), Times, Jan. 23, 1861, at 10. 
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and an account,141 and these were settled, with Dixon agreeing to pay 
£150.142 Dixon now brought an action in Common Pleas to reclaim 
compensation from Fawcus. Fawcus argued that he was not liable to 
reimburse Dixon as he (Dixon) was innocent and therefore not liable to 
Ramsey. The Court was thus required to assess how Chancery would 
have ruled. The Court of Common Pleas recognised that Dixon’s 
innocence would not have provided him with a defence, and 
consequently found Fawcus liable. Referring to Millington v. Fox, 
Crompton J, said “That decision . . . has never been overruled; and is 
binding in this Court.”143 Similarly, Hill J, agreed that “however much 
[Millington v. Fox] may have been questioned, it has not been 
overruled.”144 
The view that the rule in Millington bound the chancery courts 
became the dominant one through the 1860s.145 In Singer v. Wilson, 
decided by the House of Lords on appeal from a decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Chancery shortly before the Judicature Acts came into op–
eration, Lord Cairns LC in the House of Lords reaffirmed the principle 
underpinning Millington and observing: 
I wish to state in the most distinct manner that, in my opinion, 
fraud is not necessary to be averred or proved in order to obtain 
protection for a trade-mark . . . The action of the court must 
depend on the right of the plaintiff, and the injury that is done 
to that right . . . . I have never known any serious doubt 
entertained on this subject since the case of Millington v. Fox.146 
 
141. Ramsey v. Dixon, TNA: C15/329/R36 (Ch. 1856). 
142. Ramsey v. Robert Fawcus, C15/331/R62 (1856); Ramsey v. Henry Fawcus, 
C15/331/R63. 
143. Dixon, 3 El & El at 546. 
144. Id. at 547 (citing Millington, 3 My. & Cr. 338). 
145. In Kinahan v. Bolton, for example, the Irish Lord Chancellor, Sir Maziere 
Brady observed that “Courts of Equity would now grant injunctions in cases 
where actions at law did not lie.” 15 Ir. Ch. R. 75 (Ir. Ch. 1863), Newry 
Com. Tel., May 29, 1863. In Standish v. Whitwell, an injunction was awarded 
against a Cleveland-based firm of iron manufacturers which had innocently 
started using an image of an eagle (the family crest of the Whitwell’s), 
because an image of an eagle with outspread wings had been used as a mark 
by the West Bromwich firm, the Eagle Coal and Iron Company, for twenty 
years. Times, Mar. 10, 1866 (Ch. 1866), 14 WR 512. Page-Wood VC 
explained that an injunction had been awarded because continuing use would 
be wrongful but that its scope should not cover “colourable imitation” as 
this implied the defendant had been guilty of fraud. Standish, Times, Mar. 
10, 1866 (1866), 14 WR 512. 
146. 3 App. Cas. 376 (H.L. 1877). 
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Indeed, by the 1870s the authority of Millington v. Fox was so 
firmly established that the memory of its ever having been controversial 
was lost. In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, for example, the amnesia 
affected Bacon VC, when he observed that Millington “has never been 
questioned.”147 
III. Explanation 
How are we to understand this remarkable reversal? In this section, 
I suggest that the main impetus was the desire to develop the law in a 
manner that the judge’s saw as appropriate to the changing social 
context. Divergences within the existing precedents, in particular the 
decision in Millington v. Fox, presented the possibility of developing the 
“law” in a different direction, and the judges took that opportunity. 
In Morality and the Market in Victorian England,148 an exploration 
of a wide range of business practices—excessive speculation, business 
frauds, as well as adulteration of foodstuffs—in mid-Victorian Britain, 
G R Searle identified an “outpouring of disquiet at the low standards 
of commercial morality.”149 Another historian, James Taylor has argued 
that concern over trade morals was behind the opposition to more 
widespread use of “joint stock companies.”150 In the 1850s, newspaper 
editorials, 151 public lectures, and religious sermons repeatedly addressed 
the question of commercial morality, reflecting on its relationship with 
individual morality152 and its impact on the credit or trust that was said 
to lie behind the economic success of the nation.153 For example, The 
Huddersfield Chronicle, at the turn of 1858 bemoaned: 
 
147. 18 Ch. D. 395, 407 (H.C. (Ch.D.) 1879). 
148. G.R. Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Oxford 
1998). 
149. Id. at 77. On food adulteration, see generally id. at 91–97; Sebastien Rioux, 
Capitalist Food Production and the Rise of Legal Adulteration: Regulating 
Food Standards in 19th‐Century Britain, 19 J. Agrarian Change 64 
(2019). 
150. James Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in 
British Politics and Culture, 1800-1870, at 22 (2006) (“[C]entral to 
the case against companies was the charge that they undermined the impor–
tance of character in business.”) 
151. Few Subjects Occasion More Diatribes in the Journals than Trade Morality, 
Brighton Guardian, Apr. 11, 1860; Trade and Other Morality, Brighton 
Guardian, Apr. 11, 1860; The Treatment of Fraud, 1 Saturday Rev. Pol. 
Literature Sci. & Art 340 (1856) (criticising commercial morality and 
proposing generalised criminal law against fraud). 
152. See Trade and Other Morality, supra note 151. 
153. See Commercial Morality, Preston Chron., Oct. 25, 1856. 
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[S]ince the Railway Mania of 1845, a steady declension in public 
morals, as regards commercial transactions, has set in, and has 
been working its way in many of the ramifications of commercial 
and trading society.154 
Similar views were expressed a year later by the liberal MP and publi–
sher, Adam Black (1784–1874), in a speech that was reported in nearly 
all the surviving newspapers, declaring that “a clever tradesman and a 
man of low cunning or acute selfishness, have come to be regarded as 
convertible terms.”155 
Given this context, it is probably unsurprising that similar reactions 
occurred to cases of trade mark infringement.156 In mid-Victorian 
Britain, it seems, an increasing array of goods bore marks, and ever 
greater sums of money were spent on advertising,157 following the 
reduction in stamp duty on newspaper advertising in 1833 and its 
removal in 1855.158 The famous preacher, Hugh Stowell, observed in 
1854 that “the production of spurious and counterfeit goods forms an 
extensive branch of manufacture.”159 Two particular incidents involving 
trade marks sparked sudden widespread media coverage in starkly 
moralizing tone, linking trade mark infringement to the broader moral 
malaise: the Collins Company cases and the Taylor Persian Thread 
litigation.160 
 
154. The Commercial Convulsion and Commercial Morality, Huddersfield 
Chron., Jan. 2, 1858, at 4. 
155. The Morality of Trade, Times, Dec. 29, 1858, at 5.  
156. Of course, statements bemoaning the increase in use of counterfeit marks 
pre-date the 1850s. In Franks v. Weaver, Lord Langdale MR said that 
“[i]nstances of tradesmen endeavouring to obtain an advantage to them–
selves, by the use of the name and reputation of others, have, unfort–
unately, of late become too common.” 10 Beav. 297, 302 (Ch. 1847). In 
Rodgers v. Nowill, Wilde CJ observed that “[t]he action arises out of 
circumstances which, unfortunately, are of ordinary occurrence: and it 
would be a reproach to the law if it were not maintainable.” 5 CB 109, 122 
(C.P. 1847). 
157. The claimant in Holloway v. Holloway, for example, spent £150,000 on 
advertising, 13 Beav. 209, 209 (Ch. 1853), “a sum equal to the entire 
revenue of many a German principality,” Advertisements, 97 Q. Rev. 
183, 212 (1855). 
158. Roy Church, Advertising Consumer Goods in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain: Reinterpretations, 53 Econ. Hist. Rev. 621, 627, 632 (2000). 
159. Hugh Stowell, A Model for Men of Business 146 (1855). 
160. These two were frequently referred to together. See, e.g., Trade Marks, 
Manchester Guardian, Mar. 17, 1861. However, they were not the only 
two cases that elicited comment in this period. See e.g., Trade Morality, 
John Bull, May 16, 1857 (commenting on the “Elkington A” case). 
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A. The Collins Company Cases 
The first spate of public comment arose when a tool-manufacturer, 
the Collins Company, from the United States, brought twenty-four 
cases in Chancery, all the bills being exhibited between March and July 
1857.161 Collins had, since 1826, been an axe and machete manufacturer 
in a town that soon took the name Collinsville in Connecticut.162 Collins 
did not sell its goods in England, but had substantial markets in central 
and South America where it had obtained “a high reputation for the 
excellence of [its] goods.”163 A practice had emerged of British 
manufacturers marking the edge-tools they made with the name 
“COLLINS” and “HERTFORD WORKS,” the merchants then supply–
ing these goods to the United States, Australia, Cuba and elsewhere. 
The litigation, brought against eight manufacturers of falsely-stamped 
tools, seven printers of the offending labels, and nine merchants of the 
falsely-labelled goods,164 initially prompted the (legally very interesting) 
 
161. The defendants were (in order of the filing of the suits): William Brookes, 
C15/362/C45; Richard Thomas, C15/362/C59; Charles Thomas, 
C15/362/C67; Arthur Linley, C15/362/C71; Thomas Henry Smith, 
C15/362/C73; Thomas Underwood, C15/362/C83; Edward Smith, 
C15/362/C84; Robert Boucher Moody, C15/362/C85; Edwin Hunt, 
C15/362/C86; Solomon Barr, C15/362/C87; Charles Brown, 
C15/363/C93; Frederick Cohen, C15/363/C110; Thomas Walker, 
C15/363/C113; Robert Mole, C15/363/C114; Henry van Wart, 
C15/363/C115; John and Henry Yates, C15/363/C116; Stephen Barker, 
C15/363/C117; William Walker, C15/363/C118; Charles Shaw, 
C15/363/C119; Frederick John Smith, C15/363/C120; John Poncia, 
C15/363/C121; Charles Reeves, C15/363/C122; James Bryce Perry, 
C15/363/C123; Abraham Dixon, C15/363/C124. See also Trade of the 
Town and District, Birmingham J., June 27, 1857, at 6 (reporting 
proceedings against Cohen and noting others). The first proceeding, 
against Brookes, a Sheffield firm, followed a letter Collins received from 
an informant, a grinder named Nicholas Howe. Brookes, C15/362/C45. 
Collins then employed agents, in particular a Mr. Eddowes of Liverpool, 
to discover those involved in the Birmingham area. Id. 
162. For background on Collins Company, see Janet Siskind, Rum and Axes: 
The Rise of a Connecticut Merchant Family, 1795-1850 (2002) 
(focusing primarily on labour relations). For earlier experiences of the Ames 
Company of Chicopee, Massachusetts, suffering at the hands of British and 
German manufacturers applying the “Ames” mark to compasses and 
swords, see Martha Van Hoesen Taber, A History of the Cutlery 
Industry in the Connecticut Valley 17 (1955) (citing sources from as 
early as 1833). 
163. Illegally Striking Marks, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, June 12, 1857. 
164. For those cases involving manufacturers, see Brookes, C15/362/C45; 
Brown, C15/363/C93; Mole, C15/363/C114; Reeves, C15/363/C122; 
Smith, C15/363/C120; Thomas, C15/362/C67; Thomas, C15/362/C59; 
Yates, C15/363/C116. For those cases involving merchants, see Linley, 
C15/362/C71; van Wart, C15/363/C115; Dixon, C15/363/C124; Shaw, 
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question of whether a U.S. business could sue in England, but this was 
quickly resolved in Collins’ favour.165 Thereafter, most of the printer 
and manufacturer defendants undertook to cease making such labels or 
stamping or selling their tools in this way as soon as Collins commenced 
proceedings and offered to pay the complainant’s costs (and possibly 
compensation).166 Some defendants, however, put in answers seeking to 
explain their actions on the basis that they had been commissioned by 
merchants to make goods bearing the mark and had been supplied by 
them with the labels and patterns. In a few of the cases a formal order 
was pursued—and mostly awarded by Page-Wood VC to whom nearly 
all the cases were allocated.167 When so doing, often the Vice-Chancellor 
signaled his disapproval of the defendants’ practices both as a matter 
of morals as well as law. Granting interim relief against Brown, Page-
 
C15/363/C119; Poncia, C15/363/C121; Perry, C15/363/C123; Barker, 
C15/363/C117; Walker, C15/363/C113; Walker, C15/363/C118; Cohen, 
C15/363/C110. For those cases involving printers, see Hunt, 
C15/362/C86; Underwood, C15/362/C83; Barr, C15/362/C87; Smith, 
C15/362/C84; Smith, C15/362/C73; Moody, C15/362/C85. 
165. Brown and Cohen both demurred on this ground, arguing that proceedings 
should have been brought in the place of the property or injury, as would 
have been the case with proceedings for copyright and patent infringement. 
Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 K & J 423 (Ch. 1857); Collins Co. v. Cohen, 3 K 
& J 428, Jur. 929, 29 LTR 245, 29 LT 205, 1 Law & Bank Bull. 8 (Ch. 
1857). Page-Wood VC rejected these arguments on the basis that the acts 
involved fraud. Collins Co. v. Cohen, Times, June 12, 1857, at 11, Times, 
June 25, 1857 (Ch. 1857). It was reported that some of the Birmingham 
defendants had contemplated an appeal “to the House of Lords,” but had 
decided against it. State of Trade, Birmingham J., reprinted in Morning 
Post, July 27, 1857. For earlier proceedings on this point, see Farina v. 
Grossmith, Times, Aug. 6, 1852, at 7 (Ch. 1857) (arguing unsuccessfully 
that German plaintiff had no locus standi when he distributed goods in 
England only through an exclusive agent). 
166. There are answers in only 9 of the proceedings: Mole, C15/363/C114; 
Barker, C15/363/C117; Yates, C15/363/C116; Walker, C15/363/C118; van 
Wart, C15/363/C115; Poncia, C15/363/C121; Reeves, C15/363/C122; 
Dixon, C15/363/C124; Cohen, C15/363/C110. A demurrer was entered in 
Brown, C15/363/C93, and Cohen, C15/363/C110. 
167. There are newspaper and law reports of the cases against Brown, Cohen, 
Walker, Thomas and Reeves: Collins Co. v. Brown, Times, June 12, 1857; 
3 K & J 423 (1857); Collins Co. v. Brown, Collins Co. v. Cohen, Sheffield 
Indep., June 13, 1857; Collins Co. v. Cohen, Standard, June 25, 1857; 
Collins Co. v. Cohen (1857) 30 LTR 62; 30 LT 77 (1857); Collins Co. v. 
Cohen, Morning Chron., Jan. 13, 1858 (Page-Wood VC) (plea of privilege 
against self-incrimination rejected); Collins Co. v. Thomas, Times, July 
7, 1858 (PWVC awarded injunction and account); Collins Co. v. Thomas, 
Morning Post, July 7, 1858; Collins Co. v. Walker, Daily News, Jan. 27, 
1859 (Kindersley VC) (awarding Collins costs); Collins Co. v. Walker, 
Times, Jan. 27, 1859; Collins Co. v. Walker, 7 WR 222 (1859). 
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Wood VC observed that, “short of indictable offenses,” he knew of none 
“more discreditable than this,”168 and a fortnight later, in a hearing 
against Cohen, he called the practice a “disgraceful subterfuge which 
no honest man . . . would resort to.”169 In relation to a further case a 
year later the same judge said the “nefarious practices” which had taken 
place in this country were “impossible to justify.”170 He elaborated: 
The course of fraud had been so recklessly carried on, and the 
consciences of the manufacturers of these fraudulent goods had 
become so callous, that they looked upon the sale of them as part 
of their ordinary business, and made no distinction between the 
fraudulent and the genuine goods.171 
It was not just the Vice-Chancellor who spoke out: even the trade 
recognised the impropriety of the practice.172 
The matter garnered greater attention when a hearing came before 
Stuart VC in the middle of 1858. This case,173 against a Birmingham 
tool maker, Charles Reeves, presented very much the same pattern. 
When Collins brought proceedings, Charles Reeves submitted to an 
injunction but put in an answer defending his actions.174 Reeves ex–
plained that he had been asked by a merchant to manufacture machetes 
bearing the name “Collins & Co, Hartford, Conn.” and to apply a label 
advising customers to “Look for the stamp ‘Hartford,’ if you want the 
genuine Collins and Co.”175 Reeves had not asked whether the merchant 
had permission, but merely assumed that the merchant had the right 
to utilise the mark either as agent or licensee of its proprietor. 
Moreover, it was the custom of the trade to take and comply with or–
ders in this way, relying on the respectability of the merchant (knowing 
that to question the merchant’s authority would be regarded as 
“uncalled-for impertinent suspicion”).176 At the hearing, counsel for 
Collins, James Bacon QC (later a vice-chancellor) argued that Reeves 
was liable because, having admitted to stamping the plaintiff’s mark, 
 
168. Brown, 3 K & J 423, 433 (1857); 1 Law & Bank Bull. 8. 
169. Collins Co. v. Cohen, Chester Standard, June 25, 1857. 
170. Collins Co. v. Thomas, Morning Post, July 7, 1858. 
171. Thomas, Times, July 7, 1858. 
172. State of Trade, supra note 165 (“[A] practice which they profess to re–
probate.”). 
173. Collins Co. v. Reeves, 28 LJR 56 (Ch. 1858), 4 Jur. 865, 12 Cnty. Crt. 
Rep. 39, 6 WR 717. 
174. Charles Reeves, Letter to the Editor, Times, July 5, 1858, at 5. 
175. Answer of Charles Reeves, Reeves, C15/363/C122 (Aug. 17, 1857). 
176. Collins Co. v. Reeves, 28 LJR 56, 58 (Ch. 1858).  
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the court should presume fraud, or on the basis that there was “title to 
trade marks independently of fraud.”177 Nevertheless, Reeves’ 
mitigation received a warmer reception from Stuart VC, who noted that 
important aspects of Reeves’s answer had been uncontested by 
Collins.178 In particular, Collins had not denied the existence of the 
custom in Birmingham, nor the suggestion that Collins had authorised 
some manufacturers in England to make goods bearing the Collins 
stamps.179 Consequently, the court proceeded on the assumption that 
Reeves had rebutted any presumption of fraud. Stuart VC commended 
Reeves’s behaviour in submitting to the injunction, and continued it, 
granting Collins leave to bring proceedings at law for damages.180 The 
case eventually settled, Reeves paying £100 damages and costs.181 
The Times was scandalised that Stuart VC had praised Reeves 
rather than condemned his behaviour. On 1 July 1858, it declared: 
The day has come when you cannot judge facts from words. 
Commercial falsehood is actually creeping into our law; it is 
becoming legalized; it is becoming recognized as part of our 
jurisprudence. A lie is not a lie if it is told commercially, and for 
a commercial purpose; it is rather a creditable thing if it be told 
according to the “custom of merchants.”182 
Saying it regarded Reeves’s actions as equivalent to coin-clipping, the 
paper wondered whether it was still operating under “very old-fashioned 
and obsolete notions about what is right and what is wrong in 
commercial morality.”183 The Times’s views circulated widely, other 
papers lending their voices to the choir of disapproval. The Globe 
described the forgery of trade marks as a “growing evil.”184 The Sheffield 
Times declared that “[t]he whole thing, from beginning to end, is 
 
177. Id. at 60. 
178. Collins Co. v. Reeves, Times, June 30, 1858, at 11.  
179. Id. See also Reeves, 28 LJR at 56–57. 
180. Reeves, 28 LJR at 56–57, 60–61, 6 WR 717. 
181. Collins Co. v. Reeves, Times, Aug. 5, 1858, at 9; Daily News, Aug. 5, 1858 
(C.A. in Ch. 1858). 
182. Times, July 1, 1858, at 9. 
183. Id. 
184. London, Globe, July 1, 1858, reprinted in Sheffield Daily Tel., July 
2, 1858. 
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indefensible, and ought to be repudiated.”185 Even a Birmingham-based 
paper, Aris’s Birmingham Gazette, joined the chorus.186 
Although Reeves defended himself,187 the Times’s editorial 
generated widespread discussion that linked the question of trade mark 
infringement to matters of commercial morality in general. Some 
Birmingham traders, keen to protect the reputation of the city,188 where 
it was alleged that all but three houses were involved,189 responded by 
denying there was a custom of the kind that Reeves had alleged in his 
answer.190 The Sheffield Times said it “rejoiced” at the denial from 
Birmingham, and proclaimed its certitude that “no such lax principles 
prevail in Sheffield, and we hope they will always be discountenanced 
and discouraged.”191 The concern over moral “laxity” spread. The 
Chambers Journal of Popular Literature Science and Arts in 1858 
published: 
There is a laxity about all this which every right-minded person 
must regret. Many of the manufacturers who do these things are 
drawn into it by the custom of their trade, rather than by 
intentional roguery. Birmingham, perhaps, is about as honest as 
any of our large centres of industry; yet it is said to be a very 
frequent custom there for the manufacturers to receive orders 
from merchants to affix to the manufactured articles particular 
 
185. Forged Trade Marks, Sheffield Times, July 12, 1858, at 11, reprinted 
in Nottingham Guardian, July 15, 1858. 
186. Commercial Morality—The Collins Company v. Reeves, Aris’s 
Birmingham Gazette, July 5, 1858. 
187. Reeves, supra note 174. 
188. Commercial Morality—The Collins Company v. Reeves, supra note 186. 
189. Richard Oastler, Convocation: The Church and the People 73 
(1860) (reporting Roebuck meeting with Milner Gibson of the Board of 
Trade). According to the Birmingham Journal, fifteen of the defendants 
in the Collins litigation were from Birmingham and one or two of the 
defendants were from Sheffield and Wolverhampton. Trade of the Town 
and District, supra note 161. 
190. J. Scholefield et al., Letter to the Editor, Times, July 20, 1858, at 10.  
191. Forged Trade Marks, supra note 185. This rather self-righteous stance 
overlooked the fact that four of the proceedings launched by Collins were 
against firms operating in that city: Collins Co. v. Brookes, C15/362/C45; 
Collins Co. v. Brown, C15/363/C93; Collins Co. v. Linley, C15/362/C71, 
reported as Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 K&J 423 (Ch 1857); Collins Co. v. 
Cohen, Collins Co. v. Brown, Times, June 12, 1857; Sheffield Tel., June 
12, 1857. Proceedings against Charles Brown also led to a criminal 
prosecution against James Davenport who, while collecting evidence for the 
Collins Company, had taken one of Brown’s saws: Sheffield Indep., May 
16, 1857; Sheffield Indep., May 23, 1857. 
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trade-marks; the thing is done as a matter of course. The 
manufacturer either does not trouble himself about the morality 
of the matter, or he relies on the respectability of the merchant 
for his having authority to act as the agent of the persons whose 
trade-marks are thus used.192 
When the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce came to discuss the 
matter,193 it was keen to express that the practice of stamping other 
manufacturers’ marks was “wrong and would be discouraged.”194 
Nevertheless, questions were raised as to precisely where responsibility 
lay, or should lie, as between merchant and manufacturer. When a 
merchant insisted on the manufacturer supplying goods with a mark 
other than the manufacturer’s own, which of the two parties was most 
likely to appreciate that a third party “owned” the mark and had not 
authorised its use? Which was most likely to recognise that it was a 
mark of a third party at all? 
B. Taylor’s Persian Thread 
If the Collins litigation linked the specific practices of counterfeiting 
trade marks to general concerns of commercial morality, the intensity 
of concern was exacerbated significantly as a result of the litigation 
between Taylor v. Degatau and Dalton.195 The plaintiff was the firm of 
John and William Taylor, a Leicester-based manufacturer of thread 
that had been in business since 1828 calling its product “J & W 
TAYLOR’S PERSIAN THREAD.”196 It had rapidly acquired a 
reputation and had brought successful cases against infringers both in 
England and internationally in the succeeding decades.197 J. & W. 
 
192. Trade-marks, supra note 127, at 218–220. 
193. Half-Yearly Meeting of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, Daily 
News, Aug. 2, 1858.  
194. Earnktt Blake, Trade Marks, 6 J. Soc’y Arts 595, 595 (1858).  
195. Id. at 596; Richard Ford, To the Editor of the Manchester Guardian (Mar. 
30, 1859), reprinted in 1 Draper and Clothier 9–10. 
196. Ford, supra note 195, at 9–10. 
197. Taylor v. Leaf, Leicester Chron., Dec 12, 1834 (Ch. 1834) (VC) (granting an 
injunction against defendant, of Watling St, London, who was selling J. 
TAYLOR’S PERSIAN THREAD); Taylor v. Taylor, 28 LJR 255 (Ch. 1854) 
(Page-Wood VC), 2 Equity Rep. 290, 22 Eng. Rep. L. Equity 281, 22 LT 
271, 47 Leg. Obs. 447, Times, Jan. 20, 1854, Leicester Chron., Jan. 21, 1854; 
Leicester Chron., Jan. 27, 1854 (injunction against defendant of Manchester, 
the court noting the falling off of the plaintiff’s trade in the West Indies); 
Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784); 
Taylor v. Carpenter, 11 Paige Ch. 292 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Taylor v. Carpenter, 
23 F. Cas. 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
The Place of Scienter in Trade Mark Infringement                                  
in Nineteenth Century England 
532 
Taylor was an established and highly regarded firm,198 and had 
“acquired an immense reputation in almost every part of the 
world . . . without puffing or advertising, and simply from the worth of 
the article.”199 William Taylor (as surviving partner) brought 
proceedings against Henry Degatau, a merchant in Manchester,200 ob–
jecting to two Incidents of Degatau’s use of the “TAYLOR’S PERSIAN 
THREAD” mark.201 These were said to be violations of so “glaring, and 
at the same time so deeply designed a character,”202 that Taylor felt 
obliged to take legal action. First, Degatau had commissioned a cotton 
manufacturer in Glasgow to make reels of cotton labelled with Taylor’s 
labels and to place only 200 yards on each reel yet mark them “300 
yards”; and, secondly, Degatau was alleged to have asked a Manchester 
manufacturer, to make up reels with the name “P & F TESLOR’S 
PERSIAN THREAD.”203 Taylor was awarded an interim injunction. 
The Leicester Guardian reported the matter under the heading 
“Mercantile Morality,”204 associating Degatau’s behaviour with the 
more general moral malaise: 
The frauds practised by corporations and individuals in a public 
and private point of view, which during the last twelve months 
have come to light, have attracted and indeed concentrated the 
attention of the public mind toward them . . . . View the matter 
in any way the mind can suggest, such practices elicit feelings of 
abhorrence and condemnation in the minds of those who are 
actuated by principles of honesty, and desire the extension of our 
commercial relations and maintenance of our prosperity.205 
 
198. Trade Morality, supra note 160 (“In almost every family of the middle class 
‘Taylor’s Persian Thread’ is preferred to every other, and is continually 
used . . . .”); Tricks of Trade (“[H]ad acquired with every sempstress in the 
three kingdoms the best character for ‘good work’ and good measure . . . . 
Reels of it were to be found in every lady’s work box . . . .”). 
199. Leicester Guardian, May 22, 1858; Ford, supra note 195, at 9–10 
(discussing how Taylor’s reputation had “hitherto been considered 
unimpeachable”). 
200. According to Taylor’s amended bill, it seems Degatau was born in St. 
Thomas’s Island in the Danish West Indies. Taylor v. Degatau, 
C15/569/T45, f. 24 (Ch. 1858) (bill). Both original and amended bills 
sought a writ of “ne exeat regno.” Id. at ff. 24, 27 (amended bill). 
201. Degatau, C15/569/T45 (bill filed Apr. 28, 1858). 
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The paper then linked these concerns to smaller matters, such a trade 
marks: 
The using a trade mark of any particular firm in a clandestine 
and dishonourable manner is, in fact, as great a transgression of 
every principle of honour and justice, and as pernicious in its 
effects as frauds of a greater magnitude. Say what you will it is 
fraud; and as such deserves severe reprehension and chastise–
ment.206 
Having given an account of the background to the court case, the paper 
asked: 
Is the mercantile mind in this country becoming void of every 
principle of honour and justice? Is there nothing too gross, or too 
subtle to which it does not scruple to resort, to deprive their 
neighbours of their hardly earned and honest reputation which 
has taken years of exertion and much outlay to acquire? . . . It is 
time . . . that the commercial world should be purged . . . Let a 
higher standard of morality be cultivated by our merchants. Let 
them discard dealing with such as resort to such dishonourable 
and vicious practices . . . .207 
However, this was not to turn out to be a simple trade mark case. 
As the judge, Page-Wood VC, explained this case was “one of the most 
painful that could come before the court.”208 For, having submitted to 
the interim injunction, Degatau put in an answer and applied to the 
court for a hearing.209 In its answer, Degatau explained that Taylor had 
formerly supplied Degatau, but their negotiations had broken down. 
What stunned the court was that negotiations had only broken down 
when Taylor refused to supply Degatau with “short lengths,” reels of 
cotton marked 300 yards with only 250 or 280 yards, as it had done on 




208. Taylor v. Degetau, Times, Mar. 24, 1859; The Morality of Trade, supra 
note 137; Measurement in Thread and Cotton Winding, Leicester 
Guardian, Mar. 26, 1859. 
209. Answer of Henry Dalton, Taylor v. Degetau, C15/569/T45 (July 8, 1858); 
Answer of Henry Degatau, Degetau, C15/569/T45 (July 14, 1858). In light 
of these, William Taylor filed an amended bill on 4 December 1858. Henry 
Dalton was a commission agent through whom Degatau secured the man–
ufacturing of the thread by Thomas Jack. 
210. Answer of Henry Degatau, Degatau, C15/569/T45, f. 2 (July 14, 1858) 
(answer to interrogatory [7]) (orders by Degatau, on behalf of the Manchester 
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had come to chancery to enjoin Degatau’s dishonest behaviour when 
Taylor itself had been party to distinct, but related dishonesty in 
facilitating the sale of short lengths. Page-Wood VC appeared genuinely 
shocked and dismayed. The fact that this had been requested by the 
purchaser, and that Taylor had some months ago ceased to give in to 
these requests, was given no credit by the Vice-Chancellor whose 
response was to refuse injunctive relief to protect Taylor’s marks, 
leaving Taylor only with the option to issue proceedings in the common 
law courts.211 
The revelations produced by the litigation sparked a further outcry 
over “trade morality.” According to The Times, “British character [has 
been] disgraced accordingly in every corner of the globe,” and the 
reports of the case did, indeed, spread far and wide.212 The Saturday 
Review bemoaned the “free-and-easy, matter-of-course style of the 
order” by Degatau for the short-lengths and linked these practices to 
those that had held the public eye over the previous year—banking 
frauds and food adulteration.213 The Review worried that “the standard 
of commercial honour in the very highest rank of trade is perilously 
low.”214 Taylor was a model business with “a name for strict and 
scrupulous honesty.”215 If these were the practices of the honourable, it 
asked, what were those of the sinners?  
As with the discussion of use of the Collins Company’s marks, once 
again the question was raised whether this “disease” was prevalent in a 
particular locality, this time Manchester rather than Birmingham.216 
 
firm of Joseph Eller and Co, in June 1854, August 1854, October 1854, and 
July 1855). 
211. Lest it seem that Degatau escaped unpunished, it may be of interest that 
subsequently in the same year he was declared bankrupt. Jurist, Sept. 
24, 1859, at 350. 
212. The Times, April 3, 1860, at 9. At least as far as Bombay and Melbourne. 
See Trade Morality, The Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce, 
May 21, 1859; Trade Morality—Taylor’s Persian Thread, Argus, June 16, 
1859, at 5. 
213. The Cotton Lords, or Leicester and Manchester Measure, 7 Saturday 
Rev. Pol. Literature Sci. & Art 367, 367 (1859). See also 
Trade_Morality.—Taylor’s_Persian Thread, The Leader, No 470, 
(March 26, 1859) at 410 (“Such clear evidence of a fraudulent disposition 
generally prevalent . . . we have not before met with.”). 
214. Id.  
215. Id.  
216. Trade Frauds and the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce, 
Huddersfield Chron., Jan. 21, 1860, at 5 (attributing blame to 
Manchester, saying it was “a fair way to becoming celebrated not only for 
its advocacy of free trade, but for its practice of unfair trade”). In 1862, 
Matthew Clark of the Glasgow firm of John Clark, Junior & Co would 
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How far this sort of practice “infects other branches of Manchester 
industry is a very ugly and . . . painful suspicion.”217 The Leeds 
Mercury warned: 
[T]hey are doing all that in them lies to ruin the character of 
British commerce in the markets of the world—to lower our 
national reputation for honesty and fair dealing and thus 
eventually to ruin our and their own trade.218 
C. Commercial Immorality and Trade Mark Jurisprudence 
As a result of these two incidents, the question of trade mark 
infringement had become thoroughly entangled with general anxiety 
over the state of commercial morality. In a hugely influential article in 
the Westminster Review, entitled “The Morals of Trade,”219 Herbert 
Spencer described a raft of immoral practices that possessed “various 
grades of flagitiousness and various degrees of prevalence.”220 These 
included not just adulteration of food; exaggeration in advertising; 
spurious sales; provision of short measures; substituting cotton for silk; 
false representation of cheapness; bribing of servants; and “banking 
delinquencies.”221 According to Spencer, these were practices that were 
not just those of the “lower classes of the commercial world,” but were 
pervasive.222 These were practices which were “not only established, but 
defended,” most frequently by resort to claims of trade custom.223 
Having outlined a range of immoral practices of retailers, wholesalers, 
and manufacturers the article observed: 
Among our notes of malpractices in trade, retail, wholesale, and 
manufacturing, we have many others which must be passed over. 
We cannot here enlarge upon the not uncommon practice of using 
false trade marks; or imitating another maker’s wrappers; and so 
 
report that the winding short lengths was “practised universally” for the 
US and Canadian market. Select Committee on Trade Marks Bill 
and Merchandize Marks Bill, supra note 128, at 62. 
217. The Cotton Lords, or Leicester and Manchester Measure, supra note 213, 
at 367. 
218. The Tricks of Trade, Leeds Mercury, Mar. 26, 1859. 
219. The Morality of Trade, Westminster Review, Vol 70, No 149, 1859 
(Apr), at 357. 
220. Id at 358.  
221. Id at 357–373, 376.  
222. Id. See also The Morality of Trade, supra note 137 (suggesting Taylor 
and Degatau were “but sample of very large classes of British traders”). 
223. The Morality of Trade, supra note 219. 
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deluding purchasers. We must be satisfied with simply referring 
to the disclosures that have been made relative to the doings of 
apparently reputable houses in the purchase of goods known to 
be dishonestly obtained. And we are obliged to refrain from 
particularizing certain established arrangements, existing under 
cover of the highest respectability, which seem intended to 
facilitate these nefarious transactions. The facts we have above 
detailed are given simply as samples of the system of things which 
it would take a volume to describe in full.224 
The article saw deception of customers by misuse of trade marks as 
yet another example of commercial immorality. While acknowledging 
that there were many honest operators, the author was unable to resist 
the conclusion that the “state of things is very bad.”225 Indeed, Spencer 
explained that in many cases a businessman was faced with the stark 
choice between maintaining their integrity and failing in business, or 
doing as their competitors did. Without adequate moral restraint, he 
argued, competition would inexorably descend into a form of “commer–
cial cannibalism.”226 Significantly, Spencer did not claim that the 
situation was necessarily worse than previously (recalling Defoe’s 
description from the turn of the eighteenth century that retailers could 
not live without lying). Rather, Spencer suggested that “while the great 
and direct frauds have been diminishing, the small and indirect frauds 
have been increasing: alike in variety and number.”227 His objection was 
that these practices persisted at all given “this civilized state of ours.”228 
The cause, he posited, was valuing of wealth as an end in itself, and the 
remedy was “purified public opinion.”229 
The moral outcry over misuse of trade marks soon generated a move 
for legal reform.230 Professor Leone Levi appeared at the Society of Arts 
urging “let us purify our dealings—let us be perfectly clear of all such 
 
224. Id. at 373. 
225. Id. at 380. 
226. Id. at 381. 
227. Id. at 384.  
228. Id. at 384. 
229. Id. at 389. 
230. See also Editorial, Glasgow Herald, Dec. 23, 1859, at 4 (critiquing 
immoral commercial practices including false-marking); The Immoralities 
of Trade, Nonconformist, reprinted in Glasgow Free Press, Jan. 7, 
1860 (associating false marking with a range of immoral practices including 
adulteration). 
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imputations.”231 The Law Times had observed that it was “[o]nly in 
England, where lax commercial morality receives an unhappy impulse 
from lax laws for the prevention and punishment of commercial fraud, 
has a rogue been permitted to steal his neighbour’s name and fame and 
affix them to his own names to deceive buyers.”232 Charles Brooks, of 
Jonas Brooks, already irritated by third parties using its trade mark 
“GLACE” for thread,233 organised an “Association for Suppressing the 
Practice of False Marking and Labelling of Goods for Sale.”234 Local 
chapters of the Association were formed in Manchester, Liverpool, and 
Birmingham,235 and a deputation met with Milner-Gibson, the Pres–
ident of the Board of Trade.236 Simultaneously, local chambers of 
 
231. Professor Leone Levi on Trade Marks, Birmingham Daily Post, Mar. 
22, 1859 (describing a presentation by Professor Levi at the Royal Society 
of Arts). 
232. The Law and the Lawyers, 33 LT 73, 73 (Apr. 30, 1859). 
233. Charles Brooks had tolerated what he saw as misuse of the term by one 
competitor since 1855, but when others started to use the term, he launched 
proceedings against sewing cotton manufacturers in Derby. Brooks v. 
Evans, (Ch. 1860) C15/734/B144, Guardian, July 24, 1860 (Stuart VC), 
Times, 27 July 1860. Stuart VC refused relief because of delay in bringing 
the proceedings, but left Brooks to proceed at law. When Brooks publicized 
the litigation, Evans sought unsuccessfully injunctive relief to prohibit this: 
Evans v. BrooksLT(NS) 741 (Ch. 1860). See also Select Committee on 
Trade Marks Bill and Merchandize Marks Bill, supra note 128, at 
68. 
234. Jonas Brooks, Letter to the Editor, Fraudulent Labels, London Evening 
Standard, Dec. 21, 1859, at 7, reprinted in Morning Post, Dec. 22, 
1859, at 3; Frauds of the Trade, Law Times, Dec. 17, 1859; Money and 
City Intelligence, Law Times, Dec. 17, 1859 (observing that it was a 
“national disgrace” that such an organization was necessary); Editorial, 
In Our City Article Last Saturday, Law Times, Dec. 20, 1859; Trade 
Frauds and the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce, supra note 216, at 5 
(publishing the opinion of Coleridge on the possibility of prosecuting 
makers of short lengths for conspiracy); Oastler, supra note 189, at 71. 
235. Falsely Labelling Goods, Coventry Herald & Observer, Mar. 2, 1860, 
at 3, reprinted in Huddersfield Chron., Mar. 3, 1860, at 6 (Manchester 
branch); Falsely Labelling Goods, Daily Post, Mar. 10, 1860, at 3 
(reporting on the establishment of the Liverpool branch); Local Association, 
Globe, Mar. 28, 1860 (reporting on the creation of the Birmingham 
chapter). 
236. Fraudulent Trade Marks, Birmingham Daily Post, Apr. 3, 1860, at 3; 
Commercial Morality–Fraudulent Trade Marks, Leicester Guardian, 
Apr. 7, 1860 (reporting a meeting with Milner Gibson); Fraudulent Trade 
Marks, Morning Advertiser, Oct. 26, 1860, at 6 (reporting on the 
annual meeting). 
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commerce took up the issue.237 As the pressure grew,238 bills were 
presented to Parliament, a Select Committee heard evidence, and a new 
criminal law was adopted, the Merchandise Marks Act 1862.239 
The same pressures offer an explanation for the judicial shift 
towards a trade mark infringement rule based on Millington v. Fox, 
rather than on aligning the rules of equity with the common law, as 
expressed in Crawshay and Rodgers v. Nowill. The judges, in particular 
Page-Wood VC, were intimately involved in the cases that generated 
the outpouring of concern over trade mark misuse as a matter of 
commercial morality. As already noted, he made numerous observations 
relating to the moral impropriety of various actions.240 In 1864, giving 
judgment in a contempt proceeding brought by Jean Maria Farina, a 
maker of Eau de Cologne, the judge reflected: 
No one could rejoice more than he had done at the passing of the 
[Merchandise Marks Act 1862]; and certainly in this branch of the 
Court he had been on all occasions most anxious to correct the 
mischiefs against which the Act was directed. Perhaps in some 
instances he had gone too far. But, at any rate, there had been 
no slackness to interfere and the plaintiff had on many occasions 
assisted in the assertion of his rights.241 
 
237. Trade Frauds and the Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce, supra note 
216 at 5; The Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce, London Evening 
Standard, Jan. 20, 1860, at 2 (reporting condemnation of this “serious 
evil”); Globe, Jan. 20, 1860, at 3 (reporting similar condemnation). 
238. The Sheffield Chamber of Commerce had sent a delegation to meet with 
the Board of Trade on April 15, 1858. Sheffield Chamber of Commerce 
Annual Meeting, Sheffield Indep., Feb. 5, 1859, at 11. 
239. Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. C. 88 (Eng.); see also Select 
Committee on Trade Marks Bill and Merchandize Marks Bill, 
supra note 128. 
240. One might contrast Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337, 
376 (having reasserted that deceit requires fraudulent intent, explaining that 
if it were desirable, as he thought it would be, that any person issuing 
company prospectus to investors should be under an obligation to ensure the 
representations were correct, this was a matter for the legislature, not the 
courts). 
241. Farina v. Meyerstein, Times, Feb. 1, 1864, at 10. The defendant was a 
commission agent against whom an injunction had been issued in 
November 1857. Id. Page-Wood VC refused to commit him, instead 
ordering him to pay the costs of the motion. Id. By 1864, Farina had 
exhibited bills in Chancery on at least 15 occasions. See Farina v. 
Carmouche, C16/198/F27 (1864); Farina v. Zadig, C16/73/F63 (1862); 
Farina v. Rockfort, C15/751/F7 (1860); Farina v. Loewe, C15/753/F82 
(1860); Farina v. Meyerstein, C15/374/F73 (1857); Farina v. Silverlock 
C15/195/F12 (1855); Farina v. Spratt, C15/27/F2 (1853); Farina v. 
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Clearly, this was a field where the courts of equity were happy to choose 
the most “trade mark owner friendly” rules available in order to instill 
a higher standard of commercial morality. The rule in Millington v. Fox 
was evidently the rule that would accord more closely with heightened 
commercial morality. 
It may seem paradoxical that to promote more “moral” conduct, 
courts would adopt a standard that made irrelevant the specific 
“culpability” of a trader’s acts.242 However a subjective scienter stand–
ard failed to give the desired protection where traders were collectively 
indifferent to the question of whether they were stamping marks that 
would be understood by end-purchasers as indicating that the goods 
had been made by a particular manufacturer. 
By making liable anyone who applied a mark to goods or who sold 
or distributed goods with a mark so applied, the rule would give those 
manufacturers and distributors an incentive to ensure they were not 
using the marks of third parties. As Lord Romilly MR explained in 
Cartier v. Carlile: 
It follows that equity will restrain the further use of the trade 
mark by the person imitating it, and will make him account for 
such advantage, if any, as he may have derived from its user. 
That is the principle which is laid down in Millington v. Fox (3 
Myl. & Cr. 338), and if that principle were not followed, it would 
lead to serious consequences. A man by carefully abstaining from 
inquiring whose trade mark he was imitating, and by refusing to 
hear anything about it, might escape from all liability.243 
 
Mather, C15/28/F20 (1853); Farina v. Grossmith, C14/1324/F66 (1852); 
Farina v. Gebhardt, C14/1385/F10A (1852); Farina v. Gebhardt, 
C14/1391/F10A (1852); Farina v. Rossi, C14/1323/F35 (1852); Farina v. 
Shaw, C14/1323/F38 (1852); Farina v. Grossmith, C14/522/F43 (1846); 
Farina v. Florence, C14/522/F41 (1846); Farina v. Schooling, 
C14/522/F44 (1846). 
242. For discussions as to whether strict liability is a morally appropriate 
standard, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 171–203 
(2012); Andrew Simester, Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?, in 
Appraising Strict Liability 21 (A.P. Semister ed., 2015) (discussing 
strict liability crimes and arguing that they might be defensible for “non-
stigmatic” crimes). 
243. Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292, 298 (Ch. 1862) (Sir John Romilly MR) 
(citing Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338 (Ch. 1838)). The report in The 
Jurist does not include the assertion that “it would lead to serious 
consequences.” Cartier v. Carlile, 8 Jur. 183, 184 (1862). For Sir John 
Romilly M.R., this approach would also have been consistent with the broad 
conception that he promoted for equitable intervention for misrepresentation 
in contract. See Michael Lobban, Misrepresentation, in 12 The Oxford 
History of the Laws of England: Volume XII: 1820–1914, at 400, 
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The manufacturers could not hide behind assertions of ignorance (that 
they had never heard of “Crowley Millington” or “Collins Company”), 
nor could they successfully plead they were intending to imitate a 
“Russian mark” (rather than that of the plaintiff), nor that they were 
merely complying with the orders of a merchant.244 
All those involved in the distribution chain, including importers, 
wharfingers, wholesalers, middlemen, and consignees,245 could no longer 
claim that they believed the goods they were selling had been marked 
with the authority of the mark owner for no other reason than that the 
goods bore the mark. Trade mark owners could stop the further 
distribution of all falsely-marked goods.246 Retailers and commission 
agents would need to take care not to sell counterfeit goods,247 or goods 
 
418, 427 (William Cornish, J. Stuart Anderson, Raymond Cocks, Michael 
Lobban, Patrick Polden & Keith Smith eds., 2010). 
244. See Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292, 297–99, 8 Jur. 183 (Ch. 1862) 
(awarding an injunction and account against thread-maker who, on in–
structions of purchaser, made imitations of plaintiff’s labels). 
245. It was precisely these people who were, around this time, opposed to the 
introduction of criminal liability without an accompanying trade mark 
register. See, e.g., Petition of the Manchester Guardian Society for the 
Protection of Trade, App 627, in Report of the Select Committee on 
Public Petitions, app. at 291 (in respect of petitions presented April 29–
May 1, 1861) (“[Dealers] in goods which are so variously marked that it is 
impossible to ascertain in most cases whether any trade mark is interfered 
with, or even whether the mark is intended as a trade mark or not.”); 
Petition of Wholesale Warehousemen Carrying on Business in the City of 
London, in Report of the Select Committee on Public Petitions, 
app. at 268 (presented April 22–24, 1861) (alleging that trade marks are “so 
numerous, so varied and so undefined that it is impossible . . . to know 
them”). 
246. See, e.g., Ponsardin v. Stear, 32 Beav. 666 (Ch. 1863) (granting an 
injunction against wharfinger prohibiting further distribution of counterfeit 
CLQUOT champagne); Ponsardin v. Peto, 33 Beav. 642, 644, 33 LJ Ch 
371, 10 Jur. (N.S.) 6 (Ch. 1863) (permitting release of goods to consignee 
once trade mark had been removed); Hunt v. Maniere, 34 Beav. 157, 157–
58, 11 Jur. 28, 34 LJ Ch 142, Times, Dec. 9, 1864 (Ch. 1864) (Sir John 
Romilly MR); Hunt v. Maniere 11 Jur. 73, 34 LJ Ch 144, Times, Jan. 30, 
1865 (C.A. in Ch. 1865) (proceedings to restrain action at law by consignee 
against wharfinger in relation to counterfeit CLIQUOT champagne the 
wharfinger had refused to release); Moet v. Couston, 33 Beav. 578, 581 (Ch. 
1864) (Sir John Romilly MR) (enjoining an innocent distributor, but 
providing no account of profits). 
247. See, e.g., Burgess v. Hills, 26 Beav. 244, 247–48 (Ch. 1858) (Sir John 
Romilly MR) (holding an innocent retailer of counterfeit anchovy sauce 
liable to injunction and costs, with the plaintiff waiving the account); 
Burgess v. Hateley, 26 Beav. 249, 249 (Ch. 1858) (same). 
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made by one manufacturer in the packaging of another.248 The strict 
liability rule would also circumvent any problems that might have 
arisen in imputing “intention to deceive” to corporations,249 a mode of 
business organisation that was destined to become much more common 
after the Companies Acts of 1855 and 1856.250 Adopting the rule in 
Millington v. Fox also answered the question raised by the Birmingham 
Chamber of Commerce about whether responsibility should lie with 
manufacturer or merchant: it should lie with both. 
But why should angst over the immorality of misuse of trade marks 
influence the development of trade mark infringement law when, 
commentators tell us, the legal system failed to respond to over the 
associated morality-based concerns about deceitful corporate prospect–
uses, food adulteration, and so forth? For example, George Robb’s 
groundbreaking investigation of White Collar Crime in Victorian 
England,251 demonstrated that both courts and legislators adhered 
steadfastly to the tenets of laissez-faire, and this impeded proposals to 
reform company law. Ingeborg Paulus’s examination of responses to 
food adulteration described similar pressures against regulatory 
intervention.252 
One answer is that judicial development was more straightforward 
for trade mark law than these other fields (where reforms required new 
legislation, coupled with a new regime of public enforcers). The key 
piece in the jigsaw, Millington v. Fox, was already decided, and 
arguably the weight of that decision, as one of the Lord Chancellor, 
grew as every year passed (and as the courts became increasingly 
formalistic in the handling of precedent).253 Moreover, with trade mark  
248. See, e.g., Barnett v. Leuchars, 13 LT 495, 495–96 14 W.R. 166, 166–67 
(Ch. 1865) (Stuart VC) (issuing an injunction against further sale of 
fireworks, but refusing to award costs). 
249. See Lawson v. Bank of London, 18 C.B. 84, 84–85 (1856) (describing the 
proposition that a corporation could not be sued for such a cause of action, 
because it could not have a relevant intent to deceive). The Court accepted 
the demurrer, but on a different basis. Willes J intimated that he would not 
have accepted a defense merely grounded in corporate status. Id. at 1300–
01. 
250. Ron Harris, The Private Origins of the Private Company: Britain 1862–
1907, 33 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 339, 345 (2013).  
251. George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial 
Fraud and Business Morality 1845-1929, at 189 (1992). 
252. See Ingeborg Paulus, The Search for Pure Food: A Sociology 
of Legislation in Britain (1974). 
253. See William Williamson Kerr, A Treatise on the Law and 
Practice of Injunctions in Equity 488–89 (1867) (“The doctrine . . . 
laid down in Millington v. Fox must be considered as law until the question 
comes before a higher tribunal.”). 
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infringement, there was always a private interest in prevention, so the 
problem “that what is everybody’s business is nobody’s business” was 
not an issue.254 At the same time, the problems raised by a divergence 
in the rules between law and equity seemed likely to diminish as 
procedural reforms made it ever more clear that proceedings at law 
could and would be avoided. 
More important than these reasons, however, was the fact that the 
rule in Millington v. Fox was not seen to be in tension with “laissez-
faire.” Choosing one form of trade mark infringement rule over another 
certainly reallocated costs (and benefits), but these were as much 
between traders as between traders and, for example, consumers. 
Indeed, those who opposed regulation of trade to protect what we would 
today call the “consumer,” could stand behind enhanced protection of 
trade marks untroubled. The MP for Sheffield, John Roebuck,255 for 
example, who opposed the legislative proposals to tackle food 
adulteration,256 led the Sheffield deputation seeking stronger trade mark 
protection.257 One reason why trade mark protection was viewed by 
some to have greater importance was that trade marks offered one form 
of “private law” answer to the protection of consumers. As the London 
Review observed, linking the problem of consumer deception in relation 
 
254. Robb, supra note 251, at 160 (quoting Report of the Select 
Committee on Companies Acts, 1877, at 125 (receiving evidence from 
Jessel MR)). 
255. Roebuck was MP for Sheffield from May 3, 1849 until November 17, 1868, 
and January 31, 1874 until November 30, 1879. Fraser Rae, Roebuck, John 
Arthur (1801-1879), in 49 Dictionary of National Biography 95–97 
(Sidney Lee ed., 1897).  
256. HC Deb (Feb. 29, 1860) (66) col. 2033 (opposing food Adulteration Bill); 
HC Deb (Mar. 14, 1860) (67) col. 544 (Adulteration of Food Bill, Committee 
Stage) (stating that “the buyer was the best person to protect himself, and 
so soon as a man was found to be selling impure and bad articles he lost his 
customers”). 
257. Sheffield Chamber of Commerce, Sheffield Indep., Feb. 5, 1859, at 11 
(reporting a meeting by the Sheffield delegation, comprising Robert 
Jackson, John Robert Smith, Alderman Matthews and John Roebuck, 
with the Board of Trade to discuss trade mark protection); HC Deb (Feb. 
6, 1861) (161) cols. 115–16 (reporting Roebuck’s urging for the protection 
of trade marks); HC Deb (Feb. 18, 1862) (165) cols. 442–45 (reporting 
Roebuck seeking leave to introduce bill); HC Deb (Feb. 26, 1862) (165) 
col. 770 (reporting the second reading of Roebuck’s bill and its movement 
to the Select Committee). Roebuck then chaired the Select Committee on 
Trade Marks Bill and Merchandize Marks Bill, the outcome of which led 
to mere criminalization rather than to establishing a trade mark register. 
Reports of the Select Committee on Trade Marks Bill and 
Merchandize Marks Bill, supra note 128.  
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to “experience goods” (e.g. short lengths) to the desirability of effective 
trade mark enforcement: 
We reserve our commiseration for the purchasers of those articles 
which are not to be tested by inspection over the counter. In such 
cases no doubt it may be said that we should look to the trade 
mark. The name of a good maker is a guarantee of goodness in 
the article. Alas! For the purchaser who relies on such protection. 
What is the number of such goods which bear a genuine trade 
mark? Perhaps not one in ten.258 
Conclusion 
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, few, if any, doubted 
the authority of Millington v. Fox. The position did, however, leave 
some matters unresolved. Perhaps most importantly, recognising 
Millington as authoritative required the courts to explain the relation–
ship between the two systems of trade mark law at common law and in 
equity. Two theories emerged,259 one which sought to reconcile the rules, 
at least superficially; the other which embraced the divergence and 
pointed towards a different basis for liability in equity than at law. I 
call these “prospective theory” and “property theory.” 
According to “prospective theory,” the position at law and in equity 
were not inconsistent, but rather reflected the different viewpoints.260 
The common law was concerned with compensation for past wrongs, 
and thus was backward looking; equity was focused on preventing 
 
258. Tricks of the Trade, London Rev., reprinted in Herald, Jul. 2, 1861 
(Melbourne). 
259. A third possibility was that both law and equity acted on the basis of fraud, 
but each had different views of what amounted to fraud. See e.g., Earl of 
Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. App. 484, 490–91 (1872/73) (Lord Selbourne 
LC). 
260. See, e.g., Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., 1 H & M 271, 287 
(Ch. 1863) (Page-Wood VC) (“A Court of law may well think a Defendant 
not liable to an action for an act done absente animo malo, and quite 
consistently with this a Court of Equity may hold that if he continue to do 
the act he will commit a fraud.”); M’Andrew v. Bassett, 33 LJ 561, 10 LT 
(N.S.) 445 (Ch. 1864) (“I never could understand why the case of Millington 
v. Fox introduced any difficulty. The principle of Millington v. Fox is this, 
that although a person has used another man’s trade mark perfectly 
innocently, if he continues for one moment after he has been told of it to 
use another man’s trade mark, he does so fraudulently . . . .”). Compare the 
explanation offered as to why contracts might be rescinded in equity for 
innocent misrepresentation, in so far as it would be “fraudulent” for a 
person, once aware of the misrepresentation, “to insist upon keeping that 
contract”: Redgrave v. Hurd., 20 Ch. D. 1, 12–13 (H.C. (Ch.D) 1881) (Jessel 
MR). 
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continuation of behaviour that would cause harm, and was therefore 
forward looking. Reflecting this, the common law was concerned with 
scienter at the time of adoption of a mark; equity was concerned with 
whether continued use would be wrongful (the circumstances of 
adoption being irrelevant).261 A defendant might have adopted a mark 
in ignorance or innocence, and thus would not be liable for past acts, 
but once deception was found, it would be wrong for that person to 
continue to use the mark. In this conception, both law and equity could 
be said to be concerned with fraud: past fraud and future fraud.262 
According to “property theory,” the legal position in equity was 
different from that at law: the law was concerned with fraud, equity 
with protection of property.263 Of course, the property in a mark was 
not a right of exclusivity for all uses, just for uses on such similar goods 
that purchasers would be deceived. 264 
 
261. Singer v. Wilson, LR 3 HL 376, 400 (H.L. 1877) (Lord Blackburn) (“If he 
persevered, as he threatens to do, in this course, after learning that it does 
produce this effect, he would (unless in very exceptional cases) do a wrong 
injurious to the Plaintiffs, and should be prevented from doing that 
wrong.”); Kerly, supra note 4, at 16 (“[A person] does, in fact, commit 
a fraud when he continues his conduct after discovering its dangerous 
character.”); Marengo v. Daily Sketch & Sunday Graphic Ltd, 65 RPC 
242, 253–54 (H.L. 1948) (Lord Du Parcq). 
262. One difficulty with prospective theory is that it assumes knowledge implies 
intention, a matter that some judges have denied. See Hendriks v. Montagu, 
17 Ch. D. 638, 647–48 (H.C. (Ch.D.) 1881) (Brett MR). Relatedly, it leaves 
open the question of whether, if ever, a person has a legitimate interest in 
continuing to use a mark which was adopted innocently, for example, where 
the mark relates to the person’s own name. Id. 
263. For a detailed account of the emergence of property theory, see L. Bently, 
From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the Conceptualisation 
of Trade Marks as Property, in Trademark Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research 1, 20–28 (Graeme Dinwoodie 
& Mark D. Janis eds., 2008). See also Kenneth R. Swan, The Law and 
Commercial Usage of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks 280 
(1908) (“Millington v. Fox . . . signalises the full recognition, at least in the 
Chancery Courts, of trade marks as property capable of legal protection.”). 
264. One problem with property theory would have been reconciling the 
conclusion with the many judicial statements that there is no property in a 
mark as such. This problem was only finally resolved when the House of 
Lords held that the property that was protected was goodwill associated 
with the mark: AG Spalding & Bros. v. AW Gamage Ltd., [1915] 32 RPC 
273 (H.L.) Another problem in applying the theory was identifying what 
could constitute a mark, i.e. when a sign might be “owned.” Exponents of 
property theory occasionally sought to bifurcate protection into “trade 
marks” (protected as property) and “analogous matters” (where protection 
depended on proof of intention to deceive). One such attempt by Jessel MR 
in Singer v. Wilson was rejected by the House of Lords. LR 3 HL 376 (H.L. 
1877).  
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In principle, the choice between these two theories had (and may 
continue to have) implications.265 The most obvious related to remedies: 
if prospective theory applied, financial remedies should only arise in 
respect to past uses that were fraudulent at the time;266 if property 
theory applied, it might be open to courts at least to award an account 
of profits (and even damages) in relation to even innocent past uses on 
the basis that these profits derived from another’s property.267 As things 
 
265. According to Lewis Boyd Sebastian, the difference “may seem academic, 
but it is of real importance.” Lewis Boyd Sebastian, The Law of 
Trade Mark Registration 5 (2nd ed. 1922). For the suggestion that 
little flowed from property theory, see Bently, supra note 263, at 31–33. 
266. Moet v. Couston, 33 Beav. 578, 578–79 (Ch. 1864) (Romilly MR) 
(distinguishing Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292 (Ch. 1862) and refusing to 
order an account from a seller of Moet champagne who did not know the 
champagne was counterfeit); Leech v. Bolland, Guardian, July 4 1875 
(Ch. 1875) (Bacon V.C.) (refusing account because bill did not allege 
fraud); Ellen v. Slack, 24 Sol. Jo. 290 (H.C. 1880) (refusing account); AG 
Spalding & Bros. v. AW Gamage Ltd., 32 RPC 273 (H.L. 1915), 283, 
(Lord Parker) (“[T]he complete innocence of the party making it may be 
a reason for limiting the account of profits to the period subsequent to 
the date at which he becomes aware of the true facts.”). 
267. See Collins Co. v. Thomas, Times, July 7, 1858 (Ch.) (Page-Wood V.C. 
awarding account against defendant who had been commissioned to mark 
machetes with plaintiff’s mark); Cartier v. Carlile, 31 Beav. 292, 298 
(1862) (Romilly MR) (“[T]he liability to account for the profits is incident 
to the injunction, and that the fact of the Defendant not knowing to whom 
the trade mark he copies belongs, does not, in the slightest degree, affect 
the right of the owner to an injunction and to an account of the profits, 
as soon as he ascertains that it is imitated and used.”); Edward Lloyd, 
The Law of Trade Marks: With Some Account of its History 
and Development in the Decisions of the Courts of Law and 
Equity 82–83 (2d ed. 1865) (“In ordering a defendant to account for 
profits, the Court of Equity is not affected by the consideration of fraud. 
. . . [Cartier] seems to be a natural result from the character of the 
equitable jurisdiction in such cases, although at law the plaintiff could not 
have recovered damages without proving the scienter.”); J. Bigland 
Wood, The Law of Trade Marks: Including the Merchandise 
Marks Act, 1862, and the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, 
with the Rules Thereunder, and Practical Directions for 
Obtaining Registration 30–31 (1876) (footnote omitted) (“[H]owever 
hard it may appear upon an innocent infringer, and however ungenerous 
it may be for the plaintiff to insist upon an account in such cases, yet that 
a plaintiff who is not in any default, should be considered entitled to an 
account of the profits properly attributable to the improper use of the 
mark by the defendant.”). It is an oddity that in Edelsten v. Edelsten, 
where Lord Westbury LC embraced property theory, he took the view 
that there could be no account or compensation “except in respect of any 
user . . . after he became aware of the prior ownership.” 1 De G. J. & S. 
185, 199 (Ch. 1863). See also Ludlow & Jenkyns, supra note 26, 44–47 
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turned out, in England, in relation to registered trade marks, the 
position was reversed: damages came to be viewed as a right, an account 
of profits dependent on knowledge.268 As for use of unregistered marks 
(so-called “passing off”), property theory has slowly prevailed: the 
question of damages remained unresolved in 1948, but the current 
tendency of lower courts is to ignore the history and allow damages and 
accounts against even innocent defendants.269 
 
(indicating that no account or damages as against an innocent defendant, 
despite seeing trade mark rights as proprietary). 
268. AG Spalding & Bros. v. AW Gamage Ltd., 32 RPC 273, 283 (H.L. 1915); 
Henry Heath Ltd. v. Frederick Goringe Ltd., 41 RPC 457 (H.C.(Ch.D.) 
1924) (Eve J) (finding that in a registered trade mark case, plaintiff was 
entitled to damages even against innocent defendant); A. Blanco White 
& Robin Jacob, Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names 
15–80, 327–28 (12th ed. 1986). 
269. Young v. Holt, 65 RPC 25, 26 (H.C. 1948) (ordering an account for 
passing off even though defendant adopted sign in ignorance); Walker v. 
Ost, 87 RPC 489, 512–13 (H.C. 1970) (Foster J) (conducting an inquiry 
as to damages in passing off case without fraud); Gillette UK v. Edenwest 
Ltd., 111 RPC 279, 291–94 (H.C. (Ch.D.) 1994) (describing the absence 
of fraud as inadequate justification for the denial of damages); Reed Exec. 
PLC v. Reed Bus. Info. Ltd., [2004] EWCA Civ 159 (C.A. 2004) (Jacob 
LJ) (holding that the unwitting defendant “will have to pay compensation 
both for passing off . . . for the past use, having . . . caused real damage”); 
Mellor et al., supra note 1, at 22–158 (16th ed. 2017) (“The claimant 
has a right to damages regardless of the defendant’s state of mind, and 
that is so regardless of whether the cause of action is infringement of a 
registered mark or passing off.”).  
